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vABSTRACT 
The Mongolians have debated a potential declaration of permanent neutrality 
since September 2015. These debates have contained little or no consideration of the 
potential effects on Mongolia’s defense cooperation with foreign military. Mongolia has 
developed defense cooperation with Russia, China, and other countries in order to 
enhance military capability and interoperability. The country’s defense cooperation 
allows Mongolia’s contribution to global peace and stability activities as a vital foreign 
policy tool of the country. 
This thesis analyzes the potential effects of permanent neutrality on 
foreign defense cooperation. This analysis is based on the study of the concept of 
neutrality and the benefits and limitations of the permanent neutrality policies; the 
examination of the defense cooperation experiences of neutral countries such as 
Switzerland, Finland, Sweden, Austria, and Turkmenistan; and the evaluation of 
current foreign cooperation of Mongolia’s defense. 
If Mongolia became permanently neutral, it would likely cause defense 
cooperation challenges, such as discouraging current partners, and potential 
disengagement of current cooperation. Since Mongolia has limited military capacity, 
foreign cooperation for defense is crucial. Such cooperation will enhance Mongolia’s 
defense capacity and enable it to participate in global stability affairs. This thesis assesses 
that the permanent neutrality policy is not suitable for Mongolia’s defense foreign 
cooperation. 
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A. MAJOR RESEARCH 
Subsequent to the Mongolian Democratic Revolution in 1990 and adoption of the 
new Constitution in 1992, Mongolia developed new national security and foreign 
policies. Similar to other small states situated near powerful nations and influenced by 
their location and geopolitical environment, Mongolia has pursued a peaceful, open, 
independent, and multi-pillared foreign policy in order to promote its security concerns 
and maintain sovereignty. 
As a result of its open and multi-pillared foreign policy, Mongolia maintains 
friendly relations and wide-ranging cooperation with its two neighboring countries, the 
Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China. At the same time, Mongolia is 
also developing bilateral and multilateral relations with other countries.  
Since September 2015, when Mongolian President Tsakhiagiin Elbegdorj and his 
foreign policy advisors started campaigns to institutionalize a “permanent status of 
neutrality,” Mongolia’s political authorities, scholars, researchers, and public have 
debated Mongolia’s declaring itself as a permanently neutral state or continuing its 
current foreign policy (well known as a Mongolia’s “Third Neighbor” foreign policy). 
The president and his legal policy team have submitted a draft law, on 
maintaining the permanent status of neutrality, to the parliament for ratification. The 
National Security Council of Mongolia has supported the president’s “permanent status 
of neutrality” position and subsequently submitted its own directive to the Committee on 
National Security and Foreign Policy of the State Great Hural (Mongolia’s parliament). 
As of 10 September 2016, the State Great Hural has not discussed the issue of declaring 
permanent neutrality status.  
In the framework of Mongolia’s constitutional documents, National Security 
Concept of Mongolia, Concept of Mongolia’s Foreign Policy, and Basics of Mongolia’s 
Defense Policy, the Mongolian Armed Forces have successfully developed cooperation 
not only with neighboring military forces, but also with other developed and developing 
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countries’ militaries in order to enhance the capacity of Mongolia's military and to 
promote global peace and security activities. The Mongolian Armed Forces have actively 
participated in several United Nations peacekeeping operations, as well as NATO-led and 
U.S.-led coalition operations. Participating in peace support operations and cooperating 
with other countries’ military forces have assisted the Mongolian Armed Forces in 
developing its military personnel’s knowledge, skills, and abilities while developing 
military doctrine and upgrading their equipment. 
My research question is: If Mongolia became permanently neutral, how would the 
neutrality affect its defense cooperation with foreign military? 
This thesis will examine the benefits and limitations of the permanent neutrality 
policies that are already in place internationally with respect to the Mongolian Armed 
Forces. It will specifically examine the potential effects on defense cooperation and 
collaboration with Mongolia’s longstanding and newly developed partners. 
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH 
To evaluate how the Mongolia's Armed Forces' defense cooperation with foreign 
militaries would be affected after the declaration of a permanent status of neutrality by 
Mongolia, I examine the basic concepts of neutrality and its existence in contemporary 
permanently neutral countries. President Tsahiagiin Elbegdorj and Mongolia’s pro-
permanent neutrality scholars argue that Mongolia could develop its permanent neutrality 
as have other neutral countries such as Switzerland and Turkmenistan. Moreover, they 
assert that Mongolia should seek support for her permanent status of neutrality through a 
United Nations General Assembly resolution as Turkmenistan did.  
Declaring a permanent status of neutrality might be a simple procedure; 
maintaining the neutrality is not. As Laurent Goetschel emphasized, since neutrality and 
collective security have the same common goals as promoting peaceful solutions for 
disputes and greatly regulating and restricting use of force, neutrality in the twenty-first 
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century has lost its significance to the collective security.1 Furthermore, neutrality might 
restrict some foreign policy as an unnecessary limitation, particularly in cooperation with 
international organizations, and create isolation or aloofness for the neutral states. The 
few states continuing to pursue neutral policy in the twenty-first century, and most of the 
non-European neutral states, are smaller in size and less strategic to the international 
political arena.2 
If the Mongolian parliament approves permanent neutrality, Mongolia will not 
carry out certain defense foreign cooperation activities and some cooperation agreements 
might be terminated. The significance of my research is in its examination of the general 
concept of neutrality and examples of applications of current neutral countries, and its 
analysis of the consequences of potential effects on Mongolia’s defense foreign 
cooperation if Mongolia decides to pursue permanently neutral foreign policy. 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
There is a little literature that directly analyzes the potential effects of permanent 
neutrality on defense cooperation. Most of the related literature’s arguments are about 
European countries’ neutrality challenges due to collective security, particularly after the 
Cold War. Mongolia has built her defense capabilities based on successful cooperation 
with neighboring countries, other developed and developing countries, and international 
organizations. This literature review examines neutrality concepts, their international 
theory applications and any possible application for Mongolia as a permanently neutral 
state; considers the practical experience of existing neutral countries and potential 
neutrality applications to Mongolia; reviews Mongolia’s current defense foreign 
cooperation; and, finally, analyzes the potential effects of a permanent status of neutrality 
on Mongolia’s defense cooperation.  
                                                 
1 Laurent Goetschel, “Neutrality, a Really Dead Concept?,” Cooperation and Conflict 34, no.2 (June 
1999): 122–23, http://cac.sagepub.com/cgi/reprint/34/2/115. 
2 Alexander Spring, The International Law Concept of Neutrality in the 21st Century: An Analysis of 
Contemporary Neutrality with a Focus on Switzerland (Zurich: DIKE, 2014), 53. 
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This thesis research focuses on the challenges of permanent neutrality in the 
context of defense foreign cooperation. Therefore, studies that provide a fundamental 
understanding of neutrality concepts and explanations of neutrality in accordance with 
international relations theory are essentials for the basis of research. Moreover, academic 
research examining the experience of existing neutral countries and Mongolia’s current 
foreign defense cooperation provide fundamental understanding to analyze the potential 
challenges on Mongolia’s defense cooperation.  
Neutrality has been largely overlooked in international relations studies. Most of 
the literature explains the legal approaches to, and aspects and validity of, the existing 
international neutrality laws such as the Hague Conventions V and XIII. Efraim Karsh, 
Alexander Spring, and Cyril E. Black explain the main concepts of neutral behavior of 
states in order to survive and safeguard their sovereignty under the umbrella of neutral 
policy.3 Spring and Dieter Fleck in separate works provide a wide range of legal 
perspectives and explanations. Spring in particular analyzes historical developments in 
the neutrality and development of contemporary neutral states.4 Moreover, Spring argues 
that the Hague Conventions, which are the only international laws for neutral countries, 
are outdated. Hans J. Morgenthau argues that neutrality implies a realist worldview.5 
Furthermore, Goetschel expresses that neutrality has not been concept topic of interest 
since the end of the Cold War, so that small states should contribute to and play main 
roles towards the world’s collective security activities.6  
                                                 
3 Efraim Karsh, “International Co-operation and Neutrality,” Journal of Peace Research 25, no. 1 
(March 1988): 57–67, http://www.jstor.org/stable/423981; Efraim Karsh, Neutrality and Small States 
(London; New York: Routledge, 1988), 3–203; Cyril E. Black et al., Neutralization and World Politics, 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1968), 10–230. 
4 Spring, The International Law Concept of Neutrality in the 21st Century 150-200; Dieter Fleck, The 
Handbook of Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflicts (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 571–601.  
5 Hans J. Morgenthau, “The Resurrection of Neutrality in Europe,” The American Political Science 
Review 33, no.3 (June 1939): 473–486, http://jstor.org/stable/1948801; Karsh, Neutrality and Small States, 
98. 
6 Laurent Goetschel, “Neutrality, a Really Dead Concept?” Cooperation and Conflict 34, no.2 (June 
1999): 115–139, http://cac.sagepub.com/cgi/reprint/34/2/115. 
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Karsh defines permanent neutrality, “as a policy of consistent non-alignment in 
peacetime, overly aimed at preparing the ground for neutrality in wartime.”7 For the first 
time in international cooperation history, the Hague Conferences codified and provided a 
legal framework of neutral states’ rights and duties in land wars in Convention V, as well 
as regulations of naval warfare through Convention XIII in 1907.8 Those international 
conventions provide basic fundamental rights to bear and duties to carry out in wartime 
for the neutral states. In other words, the Hague Conventions deal with conditions in time 
of war only. As Spring asserts, there is no existing international law that provides a legal 
framework for neutral countries in the times of peace.9 
Several articles by international relations scholars have broader explanations of 
small states’ behavior in world politics.10 The balance of power theory of international 
relations explains Mongolia’s safeguarding security policy since its independence as well 
as reasons for Mongolian leaders to propose a permanent neutrality policy for the 
country’s future. Geographic location is one of the constraints for the small states’ 
behavior in international relations, especially if a small state is located as a rim state or a 
buffer state situated near greater power states.11 Mongolia is located between two great 
world powers. Both of her neighbors have nuclear capabilities and are bigger players in 
world arena. In accordance with the realist theory of international relations, small states 
implement certain policies of safeguarding their security, such as aligning with one of the 
stronger and more powerful nations and then entrusting its security to the strong power. 
                                                 
7 Karsh, Neutrality and Small States, 27. 
8 Dieter Fleck, The Handbook of Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflicts,  (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1995): 494–515; Jessica L. Beyer and Stephanie C. Hofmann, “Varieties of Neutrality: 
Norm Revision and Decline,” Cooperation and Conflict 46, no. 3 (September, 2011): 292, 
http://cac.sagepub.com.libproxy.nps.edu/content/46/3/285.full.pdf+html; Wolfgang Zecha, “Neutrality and 
International Solidarity–A Comparison Of The Policy of Certain Neutral European Countries With Respect 
to the UN,” AARMS: Academic and Applied Research in Military Science 10, no. 2 (2011): 305–26; 
Antonio S. de Bustamante, “The Hague Convention Concerning the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers 
and Persons in Land Warfare,” The American Journal of International Law 2, no.1 (Jan 1908): 95–120, 
doi:10.2307/2186561.  
9 Spring, The International Law Concept of Neutrality in the 21st Century,” 169. 
10 Gregory A. Raymond, “Neutrality Norms and The Balance of Power,” Cooperation & Conflict 32, 
no.2 (June 1997): 125, http://cac.sagepub.com.libproxy.nps.edu/content/32/2/123. 
11 Karsh, Neutrality and Small States, 81. 
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Otherwise, small states positioned among more powerful nations pursue neutral policies 
in order to avoid political and military repression from the more powerful countries.12  
To address the main research question, neutral countries’ experiences are 
fundamental in expressing the possible challenges. Most of the literature that explores the 
neutrality case study follows the scheme of Switzerland. Swiss neutrality and its 
associated actions have been discussed more frequently than any other in the neutrality 
policy studies. Switzerland has maintained its neutral policy since 1815; as such, it 
provides sufficient evidence that neutrality can be maintained successfully. John Dreyer 
and Neal G. Jesse provide four important reasons for successful Swiss neutrality; 
however, those are not proof other neutral countries will be successful.13 Conversely, 
many other neutral European countries had an ambiguous status, particularly after the 
Cold War and the establishment of the European Union. Austria, Finland, Sweden, and 
Ireland downgraded their neutrality policies. All of them are members of the European 
Union and are closely cooperating with North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).14 
There are a few more neutral countries aside from the European neutral states: 
Costa Rica, Ghana, and Turkmenistan. Turkmenistan’s neutrality would be one of special 
significance for this thesis. Most of the pro-Mongolian neutrality scholars argue that the 
neutrality of Turkmenistan can be a model for Mongolia because both countries have 
similarities. Both countries had similar political structures during the Cold War (except 
Turkmenistan was part of the Soviet Union), and both countries are dependent on natural 
resources. Turkmenistan acknowledged her neutrality by resolution of the United Nations 
(UN) General Assembly, and the resolution welcomes and respects that status, as 
                                                 
12 Stephen M. Walt, “Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power,” International Security 9, 
no.4 (Spring 1985), 7, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2538540, doi:10.2307/2538540; Ravdan Bold, The 
Security of Small State: Option for Mongolia, (Ulaanbaatar, Mongolia: The Institute for Strategic Studies, 
2000), 15; Joenniemi Pertti, “Model of Neutrality: The Traditional and Modern,” Cooperation and Conflict 
23, no.1, (1988): 53–54, http://cac.sagepub.com/content/23/1/53. 
13 John Dreyer and Neal G. Jesse, “Swiss Neutrality Examined: Model, Exception or Both?,” Journal 
of Military and Strategic Studies 15, no.3, (2014): 60–83. 
14 Marco Wyss, “Military Transformation in Europe’s Neutral And Non-Allied States,” The RUSI 
Journal 156, no. 2 (2011): 44–51, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03071847.2011.576474; Marjorie Andrey, 
“Security Implications of Neutrality: Switzerland in the Partnership for Peace Framework,” Connections: 
The Quarterly Journal 9, no. 4 (2010): 83–96. 
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acknowledging, the “legislative confirmation by Turkmenistan of its status of permanent 
neutrality.”15 The president of Mongolia recommends a similar procedure by which, 
“Mongolia would aspire to achieve understanding, recognition and support from its 
neighboring states, other countries, and international organizations such as the United 
Nations.”16 It would be beneficial to Mongolia since both neighbors of Mongolia are 
permanent members of the United Nations Security Council. In this case, both powerful 
neighbors would express their approval for Mongolia’s status of permanent neutrality 
through the UN General Assembly’s resolution.  
Nevertheless, the question remains as to whether Turkmenistan’s neutrality can be 
a model for Mongolia. Barbara Kiepenheuer-Drechsler approached the behavior of 
Turkmenistan’s foreign policy as an isolationist policy, as “the striving for peace through 
a strategy of positive neutrality.”17 She further states that this neutrality policy, as well as 
political myth, reflects “Turkmenistan’s preference of mutual relations over multilateral 
engagement and it creates more isolation of the country.”18 Turkmenistan’s potential 
security problems are challenging, and the country has to manage internal and external 
threats alone due to its neutral policy.19 
Mongolia has pursued a neutral policy based on its geographic location, and 
geopolitical interest. Several studies and official documents have addressed Mongolia’s 
current neutral policy in its foreign and security policies in the framework of Mongolia’s 
Constitution. 
                                                 
15 United Nations Security Council, “Permanent neutrality of Turkmenistan,” UN resolution 50/80, 
Maintenance of international security, A/RES/50/80, A-B: 90th plenary meeting, 12 December 1995, 
http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/50/a50r080.htm. 
16 Tsahiagiin Elbegdorj, “Mongolia-Neutrality,” The Office of the President of Mongolia, last 
modified January 8, 2016, http://www.president.mn/eng/newsCenter/viewNews.php?newsId=1662. 
17 Barbara Kiepenheuer-Drechsler, “Trapped in Permanent Neutrality: Looking Behind the Symbolic 
Production of the Turkmen Nation,” Central Asian Survey 25, no. 1–2 (2006): 129. 
18 Ibid., 129–130. 
19 Najia Badykova, “Regional Cooperation in Central Asia: A View from Turkmenistan,” Problems of 
Economic Transition 48, no. 8 (2005): 88–89. 
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Mongolia has been a democratic country since 1990, and she has been pursuing a 
peaceful, multi-pillar foreign policy like many other small states in order to survive 
among the more powerful countries. Mongolia has been implementing policies that are 
neutral in substance since she adopted a democratic Constitution in 1992.20 Mongolia has 
been pursuing neutral and non-alignment security and foreign policies in the framework 
of her Constitution, national security policy, foreign policy, as well as her defense policy. 
Moreover, several publications describe and analyze Mongolia’s current foreign policy 
commonly known as “the third neighbor foreign policy.”21 This foreign policy permits 
Mongolia's increased cooperation with democratic countries and an enhanced profile in 
the international arena, while counterbalancing its relationship with neighboring powerful 
countries.22 The Mongolian Armed Forces have played a significant role in successfully 
executing Mongolia’s foreign policy by participating in world peace and security 
operations and developing military-to-military cooperation to enhance its capacity for 
peace keeping purposes.23 
To address the potential challenges of permanent neutrality status on Mongolia’s 
defense cooperation, the thesis examines Mongolia’s current cooperation with other 
countries’ defense sectors. Several works in the literature examine current defense 
cooperation of the Mongolian Armed Forces. In the framework of Mongolia’s foreign 
policy, Mongolian foreign defense cooperation, which is based on coordination and 
integration with other countries' defense sectors, is intended to establish civil-military 
relations and enhance military capacity through peacekeeping training and participation 
in the peace operations. Cristina F. Matei, Christopher Plutz, and Jargalsaikhan Mendee 
                                                 
20 Tsahiagiin Elbegdorj, “Mongolia-Neutrality,” The Office of the President of Mongolia, last 
modified January 8, 2016, http://www.president.mn/eng/newsCenter/viewNews.php?newsId=1662. 
21 Jeffrey Reeves, “Rethinking Weak State Behavior: Mongolia’s Foreign Policy Toward 
China,” International Politics 51, no. 2 (2014): 254–271, http://www.palgrave-
journals.com/ip/journal/v51/n2/abs/ip20146a.html. 
22 Vaishali Krishna, Mongolian Foreign Policy Implications for Russia and China, Mongolian Journal 
of International Affairs 19, (2014): 75, doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.5564/mjia.v19i0.406.  
23 Christopher Pultz, “The Role of Peacekeeping in Mongolia’s Military Strategy: A New Paradigm 
for Security,” Asia Policy 17, no. 1 (January 2014): 128, 
https://muse.jhu.edu/journals/asia_policy/summary/v017/17.pultz.html.  
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have highlighted Mongolia's clear commitments to defense foreign cooperation in order 
to enhance its peacekeeping capacity.24 Moreover, Mendee’s analysis emphasizes how 
the Mongolian military consolidates its military norms with Western military norms to 
enhance its capacity. The Mongolian military has successfully adopted Western military 
norms in its institutions and developed a unique military relationship with U.S. allies in 
Asia such as South Korea, Japan, and some South Asian countries, such as Indonesia, 
Malaysia, and Vietnam. It also developed such relationships with some NATO member 
nations in Europe, including Germany, Turkey, Belgium, and with Canada.25 
The main focus of this research is finding the potential constraints and limits of 
permanent neutral policy on Mongolia’s defense foreign cooperation with other 
countries’ defense sectors in order to enhance its capability. Those aspects are discussed 
based on customary laws and concepts of neutrality and the neutral countries’ experience, 
particularly in military cooperation. 
D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATION AND HYPOTHESES 
The Mongolian Armed Forces have been actively participating in UN 
peacekeeping operations as well as other international peace support operations since 
2002, and they have been improving their image based on their performance and 
experiences.  
In the case of the Mongolian parliament approving the bill of “permanent status of 
neutrality,” the status would have wide-ranging negative effects on defense foreign 
cooperation. Mongolian defense foreign cooperation faces challenges and might 
                                                 
24 Jargalsaikhan Mendee, Mongolia’s Peacekeeping Commitment: Training, Deployment, and 
Evolution of Field Information Capabilities (Washington, DC: National Defense Intelligence College, 
2007); Florina Cristina (Cris) Matei, “Developing Effective Armed Forces in the Twenty First Century 
Case Studies of New Democracies,” Journal of Defense Resources Management 2, no. 1 (2011): 21–38; 
Jargalsaikhan Mendee, “Asymmetrical Military Socialization: Mongolia as a Case Study,” Armed Forces & 
Society 39, no.2 (2013), 305–330, doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0095327X12441323 ; Jargalsaikhan 
Mendee, “The Military Training Assistance Program (MTAP): Merging Interests of Mongolia and 
Canada,” Canadian Military Journal 10.1, no.30 (2009), 
http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/vol10/no1/doc/06-mendee-eng.pdf.  
25 Jargalsaikhan Mendee, “Asymmetrical Military Socialization,” 318 ; Jargalsaikhan Mendee, 
“Finally, A New Era in NATO-Mongolia Relations, “Voices from Central Asia 1” (2012): 1–6. 
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terminate some of the relationships such as cooperation in the NATO-led peace operation 
in Afghanistan. The Mongolian Armed Forces has been successfully developing 
enhanced peacekeeping capacity through cooperation with powerful countries, an effort 
that could be lost. Similarly, further support for the Mongolian Armed Forces' 
participation in global peace and stability activities could also be lost in parliament 
approves permanent neutrality status for the nation. 
E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This thesis reviews the concept of neutrality, analyzes the benefits and limitations 
of neutral policies, and reviews the possible reasons for Mongolia to declare a permanent 
status of neutrality.  
Moreover, this thesis examines case studies of existing neutral states’ policies 
toward collective security and defense cooperation. The neutrality policies of Switzerland 
and Turkmenistan are the main cases studied; furthermore, the neutral policies of Austria, 
Finland, Ireland, and Sweden provide potential supporting arguments for the neutrality 
examples.  
Additionally, the thesis examines current Mongolian defense cooperation with 
neighboring countries’ defense sectors as well as other countries’ defense strategies. The 
review addresses the benefits as well as challenges of the cooperation. 
Based on the examination of the concept of neutrality and the customary law of 
neutrality, neutral countries’ case studies and the current state of Mongolian defense 
foreign cooperation, the thesis provides critical analysis of the potential effects of 
permanent neutrality policy on the current defense policy and future cooperation. 
F. STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
This thesis consists of five chapters. After the introduction, Chapter II primarily 
focuses on the theoretical perspective of neutrality based on conventional rights and 
practices. It identifies the benefits and limitations of the neutrality policy. Chapter III 
discusses the case studies of the neutrality of Switzerland, and other European neutral 
countries, as well as Turkmenistan’s positive neutrality policy. Moreover, Chapter III 
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provides applications and implications of permanent neutrality status for Mongolia based 
on the practices of existing neutral countries.  
Chapter IV reviews current Mongolian defense foreign cooperation and its 
benefits as well as challenges.  
Chapter V recapitulates the findings of previous chapters and offers a critical 
analysis of potential effects of the permanent neutrality status on the cooperation and 
development of the Mongolian Armed Forces. 
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A. CONCEPT OF NEUTRALITY 
The idea of being neutral has developed as a method to avoid being part of 
someone else’s war or conflict. The concept of neutrality is as old as the concept of war, 
as Karsh notes: “Ever since human beings began to wage war upon one another, there 
have been individuals or groups that have sought to avoid participation in a war.”26 
Scholars debate whether neutral states benefit from the policy of neutrality or are 
challenged by limitations of neutrality. If this policy had been beneficial, the countries of 
the world would have implemented neutral foreign policies and the whole world would 
enjoy eternal peace.  
The main focus of this thesis is defense cooperation between a neutral country 
and powerful countries and collective security organizations. The objective of this thesis 
is to identify the possible benefits and limitations of neutral policy on defense. This 
analysis is based on the international legal rights and duties of the neutral countries and 
on the experience of existing neutral countries.  
This chapter addresses the definition of neutrality and the legal perspective of the 
rights and duties of neutral states; the appeal of neutrality for states; defense and security 
policies of the permanently neutral countries; constraints and restraints of the permanent 
neutrality; and Mongolia’s possible interest in permanent neutrality status.  
1. Definition of Neutrality  
This section examines different definitions of permanent neutrality and powerful 
countries' consideration of the position of neutral countries. Moreover, it reviews the 
ways of becoming a neutral country and some duties and rights of neutral countries in 
accordance with Hague Conventions V and XII as international laws for the neutral 
countries.  
                                                 
26 Karsh, Neutrality and Small States, 13; Laurent Goetschel, “Neutrals as Brokers of Peacebuilding 
Ideas?,” Cooperation and Conflict 46, no.3 (2011), 313, doi: 10.1177/0010836711416957.  
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Neutrality was a topic of interest through the nineteenth century and the first half 
of the twentieth century due to the conflicts and contradictions among global 
superpowers. Today, scholars study the general definition, general concept, and principle 
of the international legal framework of the neutrality based on the Hague Conventions V 
and XIII which address the rights and duties of neutral countries.  
Spring has defined neutrality as, “the status of a state which does not participate 
in an armed conflict between other states.”27 Thus, states, particularly small ones, and 
those that are weak militarily, and economically, choose to be neutral when possible 
conflicts arise among the powerful nations around them.  
Moreover, strong states often prefer neutral neighbors since they act as buffer 
between other strong, potentially threatening states. On the other hand, the idea of 
perpetual neutrality has developed among those small states in order to abstain from all 
possible future wars and conflicts making neutrality an appealing option among powerful 
and weak states. The powerful countries prefer having a buffer state at their periphery 
with another quarreling powerful state. For instance, Great Britain supported Belgium’s 
neutrality when Germany became a power in Europe in the nineteenth century. As 
another example, Austria became a neutral country between the two contradicting power 
blocs of Communism and Capitalism during Cold War. These powerful countries’ 
interests provided vital benefits for the small states to survive along with the balancing of 
power among them. At the same time, these “neutrals” succeeded in gaining guarantees 
from the powerful nations for safeguarding their survival in case of war. 
According to Spring, neutrality can be divided into two main categories within the 
framework of the international legal perspective of neutrality: relative and permanent 
neutrality.28 Mainly, states choose to pursue these two types of neutral policies depending 
on their interests and the situations they encounter. Relative neutrality allows the states to 
stay neutral and not be part of any particular conflict; when that conflict is over, the state 
                                                 
27 Spring, The International Law Concept of Neutrality in the 21st Century, 34. 
28 Ibid., 20–23. 
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might not stay neutral.29 For instance, Belgium and Luxembourg did not pursue a 
permanent neutral policy after World War II based on their experiences of powerful 
countries’ disregard of their neutrality during two drastic wars in the twentieth century.  
Permanent neutrality is different from relative neutrality: it does not allow the 
state to participate in any conflicts or hostilities at any time. Black provides a 
conventional definition of permanent neutrality: 
A state whose political independence and territorial integrity is guaranteed 
permanently by a collective agreement of great powers, subject to 
conditions that the neutralized state will not take up arms against another 
state, except to defend itself, and will not assume treaty obligations which 
may compromise its neutralized status.30 
Moreover, Karsh defines permanent neutrality as, “a policy of consistent non-
alignment in peacetime, overtly aimed at preparing the ground for neutrality in 
wartime.”31 In this regard, permanent neutrality is the position of a country that expresses 
its will to: abstain from any future wars and armed conflicts against any-one unless 
required to conduct self-defense against the threats to its neutrality, not support any 
belligerents that are in war or conflict, and not align with any country militarily at any 
time. Moreover, a permanently neutral state must not joint in any military alliances, have 
any foreign military installations on its territory at any time, nor maintain any foreign 
military forces’ presence domestically for sustaining its neutral policy.32  
Neutrality creates ambiguity for powerful countries due to neutral countries' 
behavior towards belligerents during wartime. Powerful states weigh the risk that the 
neutral country may switch its position to the winning side for its own interests at any 
time.33 Furthermore, depending on the geographic location, a belligerent state might 
violate its neighbor country’s neutrality based on the belligerent’s preemptive self-
                                                 
29 Spring, The International Law Concept of Neutrality in the 21st Century, 36. 
30 Cyril E.Black et al., Neutralization and World Politics, xi. 
31 Karsh, Neutrality and Small States, 27. 
32 Goetschel, “Neutrality, a Really Dead Concept?,” 118.  
33 Karsh, Neutrality and Small States, 43. 
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defense and the military necessity of safeguarding its sovereignty.34 This idea has proved 
true. For instance, Switzerland, Spain, and Sweden remained as neutral states while other 
neutral countries such as Belgium and the Netherlands could not enjoy their benefit of 
neutrality during the drastic wars in the twentieth century. Germany violated Belgium 
neutrality in 1914 in order to safeguard its own security and solve its geographic 
problem. Germany considered this violation as an act of preemptive self-defense to avoid 
fighting in two fronts in war.35 
However, the three successful neutrals (Switzerland, Spain, and Sweden) violated 
their own neutrality for the winning powers in order to maintain their independence and 
sovereignty. When Germany was superior in the war, all three states violated their 
neutrality in favor of the Axis, and when the Allies became superior in the war, all 
violated their neutrality in favor of the Allies. Sweden and Switzerland allowed German 
forces to transit though their territories, while Spain established German bases on its 
territories. In addition, Switzerland allowed British aircraft to fly over its territory and 
provided broad intelligence for the Allies, and Sweden provided arms and military 
equipment for Norway to fight alongside the Soviet Union.36  
Since these cases caused uncertainty among powerful states about the neutral 
states, the neutral states have had to show compliance with their duties in accordance 
with international laws. Neutrals, particularly permanent neutrals, prefer to have certain 
bilateral or multilateral agreements and treaties with powerful states to guarantee their 
safety and inviolable status of neutrality during wartime. Permanently neutral states need 
to build and maintain proper credibility at all times to ensure their neutrality in wartime.37 
Otherwise, potentially belligerent countries could target the neutral countries at their 
borders as a matter of strategic necessity and safeguarding their own security. Consider 
the example of Germany violating Belgian neutrality in 1914 to solve its geographic 
                                                 
34 Isabel V. Hull, A Scrap of Paper: Breaking and Making International Law During the Great War 
(Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2014), 26. 
35 Ibid., 23–29. 
36 Karsh, Neutrality and Small States, 55–59. 
37 Ibid., 36. 
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problem as a preemptive self-defense action in a two-front war.38 In this case, any 
guarantees of neutrality became “a scrap of paper,” as it was phrased in British 
Ambassador Sir E. Goschen’s report.39  
Permanently neutral policy began to conflict with collective security, especially 
when victorious countries started establishing post-war international organizations after 
the two World Wars. The United States led the other European states to establish the 
League of Nations in 1920 and the United Nations in 1945. Those powerful countries 
excluded or greatly challenged the neutral states due to potential uncertainties; moreover, 
the nature of neutrality does not match with the alliance of countries and collective 
security actions against potential belligerent countries.40 Particularly, the founders of the 
United Nations had great doubts about the eligibility of neutrals for the new security 
collective organization, probably resulting from the effects of the actions of neutrals in 
World War II. In this regards, the UN Security Council had debates on neutral countries 
joining the organization as members in the early days of the organization’s 
development.41 Moreover, a collective security organization’s behavior, such as military 
and economic sanctions or possible military interventions against aggressor states, 
contradicts the concepts of neutrality. 
Neutral countries develop their own concept of neutrality based on their 
significance in geopolitical situations and potential external threats.42 Therefore, neutral 
countries’ approaches to declare and gain guarantees for this status are different 
depending on the world political situation and development. Basically there are two 
methods to establish neutrality: by treaty or by unilateral declaration. Some countries 
have declared their neutrality on their own and let other countries recognize and 
guarantee their neutrality; while some countries have been forced to become a neutral 
                                                 
38 Hull, A Scrap of Paper, 23. 
39 Ibid., 42. 
40 Spring, The International Law Concept of Neutrality in the 21st Century,27, 32; Karsh, Neutrality 
and Small States, 108; Black, et al., Neutralization and World Politics, 52. 
41 Karsh, Neutrality and Small States, 115. 
42 Spring, The International Law Concept of Neutrality in the 21st Century, 33. 
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country.43 For instance, after the Napoleonic War, powerful countries in Europe (Austria, 
France, Great Britain, Prussia, and Russia) recognized and guaranteed Switzerland’s 
status of permanent neutrality at the Congress of Vienna in 1815. Those powerful 
countries applied similar procedures to other neutral countries in the nineteenth century: 
Belgium became a neutral country by the Treaty of London in 1839 and Luxembourg by 
the Second Treaty of London in 1867. Powerful countries proscribed Austria and Laos’s 
neutrality in the twentieth century and guaranteed their neutrality.44  
However, Turkmenistan declared its status of permanent neutrality voluntarily 
and the country’s legal status of permanent neutrality was endorsed with non-binding 
expression through a UN General Assembly resolution in December 1995. Turkmenistan, 
according to Spring, “was the first case where an international organization recognized a 
unilateral neutrality declaration.”45 Turkmenistan legalized this formal recognition of its 
status of permanent neutrality as customary law in 1996.46 
The international framework of neutrality is provided by the Hague Conventions 
V and XIII. These are the only international documents to provide duties and rights for 
relatively neutral states as principal instruments; however, those conventions deal with 
the condition in time of war only, not in peacetime. In other words, there is no 
international treaty or legal documentation that confers the status of permanent 
neutrality.47 Therefore, as Spring affirms, "permanently neutral states have a certain 
margin of appreciation for the determination of customary law rules which has to 
orientate itself at the core concept of neutrality of the Hague Convention.”48 
The Hague Convention V defines the legal rights and duties of neutral countries 
in land warfare, while Convention XIII deals with the rights and duties of the neutral 
                                                 
43 Nasir A. Andisha, “Neutrality in Afghanistan Foreign Policy,” Special Report 360. United States 
Institute of Peace (March 2015), 3. 
44 Black, et al., Neutralization and World Politics, 3–4. 
45Spring, The International Law Concept of Neutrality in the 21st Century, 81. 
46 Ibid., 81. 
47 Ibid., 169. 
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states in naval warfare. According to Convention V, the territory of a neutral state is fully 
protected from any effects by the hostilities of belligerents.49 It also provides the legal 
framework for not allowing the belligerents to use the territory of neutrals for military 
purposes, and for not allowing belligerents to recruit the neutral countries' population into 
their armed forces. According to the Convention, neutral states can maintain their own 
military forces only for self-defense, and it does not allow the states to join any military 
actions nor alignment activities at any time. 
Apart from those rights, neutral countries have duties to carry out in accordance 
with Hague Conventions. A neutral country must not participate in a war either directly 
or indirectly. The neutral country should not provide any support to the warring parties. 
For example, neutral states must prohibit the following actions according to The Hague 
Convention V: any belligerents’ military presence in their territory, sea, or airspace; 
transiting belligerents’ military equipment through their countries; supplying the 
belligerents with any military supplies including ammunitions, weapons, and any other 
war materials; crediting financial support as well as any unlawful assistance; and 
recruiting troops in order to support the belligerents.50 Nonetheless, neutral states can 
make trades involving non-war material to belligerents, but the neutral state must treat 
each belligerent with the same level of impartiality. 
Furthermore, the conventions provide more duties for the neutral states to affirm 
the safety of war victims such as prisoners of war, escaped prisoners of war, and 
internees, including the wounded and sick.51 Even neutrals have a duty to provide 
humanitarian assistance to refugees and asylum for displaced persons. Although neutrals 
are allowed to conduct trade with belligerents, neutral states have a duty to prevent arms 
trading to belligerents, either as exports or by transporting arms through its territory.  
                                                 
49 Dieter Fleck, The Handbook of Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflicts (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1995), 494–498. 
50 Christine Agius and Karen Devine, “Neutrality: A Really Dead Concept?,” A 
Reprise,” Cooperation and Conflict 46, no. 3 (2011): 270. 
51 Dieter Fleck, The Handbook of Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflicts, 498-500. 
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To conclude the section, neutral status is a political position that enables a small 
and weaker state to avoid being part of more powerful countries’ conflicts. It also 
prevents the neutral state from joining any particular alignment against others. Neutral 
countries can develop their own neutral concepts based on the political and security 
situations around them. Neutral countries have rights and duties that are protected by 
international law as defined by the Hague Conventions. Such laws enables them to 
maintain their neutrality in time of war and some aspects of the conventions could also 
apply to permanent neutrality. Moreover, neutral states need to establish proper 
credibility in order to gain the trust of powerful countries, develop close cooperation with 
collective security organizations, and avoid possible threats or ambiguities related to their 
neutrality.52  
2. Why Do States Choose Neutrality? 
This section provides a brief overview of the reasons that states become neutral 
states. It includes international relations scholars’ explanations of neutrality and neutral 
states’ defense policies.  
Neutrality has become one of the important concepts in world political studies and 
international relations since the nineteenth century, because many small states pursued 
neutral policy as a survival strategy within a polarized international system, particularly 
in the twentieth century. Furthermore, many small states do not have powerful military 
forces, and they do not want to be torn apart by warring belligerents. They wish to sustain 
their independence and sovereignty. In addition, in the case of Switzerland, it seeks to 
maintain to the unity of its population that consists of diverse nationalities, especially 
when powerful neighboring states are at war among themselves. One of the solutions for 
such small states to avoid other countries' wars or conflict and sustain their own 
sovereignty is to become a permanently neutral country. In doing so, they must pursue a 
neutral foreign policy by which they treat other countries equally, while maintaining their 
                                                 
52 Karsh, Neutrality and Small States, 35–38. 
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internal and external equilibrium. Many states believe neutrality can guarantee their 
sovereignty and security. 
World Wars I and, II and the Cold War of twentieth century as well as 
asymmetric warfare in the first decade of the twenty-first century have challenged neutral 
policy.53 Only a few small neutral states succeeded in maintaining neutrality through 
different challenges in the twentieth century. In fact, many neutral states changed their 
stance at the end of twentieth century, particularly European neutral states. 
According to the realist perspective of international relations, as central actors of 
the international system, all states maintain some level of power to ensure their own 
security. Kenneth N. Waltz asserts, “The aims of states may be endlessly varied; they 
may range from the ambition to conquer the world to the desire merely to be left 
alone.”54 Great power states seek dominance in their own regional or global systems and 
define international politics; moreover, no hegemony wants a peer in its system.55 This 
fear of great powers creates potential rivalry or conflict in a region or globally. 
Frequently, states that are weak economically, politically and militarily, particularly those 
near powerful states, pursue neutrality through their foreign and security policies. Neutral 
policies or non-alignment policies support small states’ independence, and help them 
abstain from possible conflicts among powerful countries. Small states consider 
themselves insecure in their economic and security perspectives against those powerful 
rivals. One of the options for the small states is remaining detached from their conflicts 
and staying neutral to belligerent powers. 
Moreover, the realists’ main consideration about sustaining their existence and 
pursuing their national interests is power; the state must be able to defend itself against 
any treats and maintain the power needed to defend its interests. Thus, the realist theory 
of international relations does not support neutrality as a vitally important policy for a 
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state’s existence. As Christine Agius points out, although realist theory acknowledges 
neutrality, it has not supported neutrality as a viable stance for state behavior and does 
not express interest in developing the neutrality policy as a serious part of its main 
consideration for power of the states.56 The only acceptable explanation for neutrality in 
accordance with the realist perspective is that the small, weak states choose to remain 
neutral during any conflict if the state justifies it as the only policy for sustaining its 
survival as well as protecting its self-interests.57 Furthermore, Neal G. Jesse affirms a 
neutral stance is "to be the product of rational calculation of a small state’s interests and 
capabilities that creates the state-centered, unfriendly, and self-help international 
environment."58  
As realist theory would acknowledge, geographic location is one of the major 
constraints for the countries related to their survival. This is especially true for weak 
states that like any other country, cannot choose their neighbors. In accordance with the 
realist theory, small states pursue two types of foreign policy in order to preserve their 
independence: entrusting their security to a powerful state for balancing power against 
possible adversarial countries, and conducting neutral policies to isolate themselves from 
either opposing or supporting powerful countries.59  
Geographic location poses challenges for some small states in sustaining their 
existence or sovereignty. Karsh affirms that two major geographic locations, as rim and 
buffer, provide advantages to small states on the periphery of great power states. Rim and 
buffer states are always attractive to great powers because these small states prevent from 
others controlling these areas, or one great power may have a small countries closely 
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cooperate with it in rivalry with other great power states.60 Neutrality, then, cannot be a 
viable policy for rim and buffer states. In a worst case scenario, if war erupted between 
two great powers, the great powers could violate the buffer and rim states’ neutrality for 
reasons of geographically strategic importance or as a “military strategic necessity,” as 
has been seen in the past. In particular, powerful belligerent states always consider buffer 
and rim states as strategically important places, and so desire to control these areas before 
losing them to a rival power.61 For instance, the Soviet Union tried to conquer Finland in 
the 1930s, and Germany violated Belgium's and Luxembourg’s neutrality at the 
beginning of the World Wars. 
According to Neal’s defining based on the liberal’s perspective, a state chooses 
neutrality based on domestic factors or international normative consideration and 
contribute to international institutions that create collective security with or without 
increasing directly the neutral’s own security.62  She also states, “the liberal perspective 
believes that international institutions can and should be created. These institutions help 
to build collective security into the international system.”63 The objectives of collective 
security, which are international impartiality and a willingness to settle disputes in a 
peaceful manner, are similar to those neutral countries’ efforts. Moreover, the liberal 
view of neutrality places greater emphasis on economic factors rather than geographic or 
military strategic ones as contributing to the security of neutral states. The most of 
European neutral states have a desire to join organizations that benefit their economy and 
trade development. Interaction of the states through international organization, and 
economic interdependence among the states are key factors for peaceful solution for any 
conflicts.64  Neutrals have to be actively involved in international security activities in 
order to promote their own security as well as to improve regional and global security as 
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part of a collective security effort promoting peace and stability, since liberals do not go 
to war against each other.  
The constructivist perspective of neutrality is based on the country’s identity and 
beliefs about the country’s history and its significance in geopolitics. As Goetschel 
emphasizes, the concept of neutrality in relation to the constructive theory of 
international relations is that neutrality provides positive impacts on values, social 
structure, cultural and historical environment, and shapes the nation’s identity based on 
the state’s interests. Moreover, neutrality generates normative ideas on a state’s foreign 
and security policies that affect a nation’s identity.65 For European neutral countries, the 
impetus for maintain neutral status may have changed or even waned. Yet, as Goetschel 
observes, “Even though neutrality has lost its realistic survival function, it continues to 
serve as provider of national identity for neutral states.”66 Since neutrality is quite a broad 
subject in international relations it would be interesting to see how different schools of 
thoughts view the neutrality.  
Small states are interested in pursuing neutral policy due to its limited capacity of 
securing their sovereignty and favoring the privileges of security under the umbrella of 
international law for neutral states, while abstaining from others’ conflicts or war. Every 
neutral state has its own reasons and fundamentals for becoming a permanently neutral 
state, but the general principle of being a neutral state is to avoid balancing against the 
certain policy of powerful countries and not to comply with any policy of the powerful 
countries.  
Different schools of thoughts of international relations have their own perspective 
for explaining the neutrality based on their theories, all agree that states seek peaceful 
solutions for any conflict. Moreover, beyond this desire to seek peaceful solutions to 
potential conflicts, states need to maintain certain military capacities for defending their 
territorial integrity and sovereignty. Vulnerable small states with limited defense 
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capabilities may have to seek neutrality; however, the neutrality may increase its security 
vulnerability by restricting some of the security cooperation.  
3. Defense of the Neutral Countries  
As Goetschel has affirmed, states with limited military capacities may pursue 
neutrality to maintain their security.67 Although adopting a permanent status of neutrality 
is a state’s political decision, which is thought of as significant only for the foreign policy 
of the state, the policy would affect all government agencies. In this regard, there is a 
need to study the potential impact of this status on defense cooperation, particularly, a 
small state’s defense cooperation with foreign armed forces.  
As states developed their own concepts of neutrality based on their unique 
requirements, they must also create different policies for their defense. In accordance 
with “The rights and duties of neutral states- Hague Convention V,” a neutral state is 
permitted to use military forces to defend its neutrality against any belligerents that are 
violating its rights.68 There is a controversy over whether military forces could be used 
by neutrals to defend their own sovereignty without having any effects on their neutral 
status. Furthermore, according to Fleck, “In connection with its duty to defend neutrality, 
it has been debated whether and to what extent neutrality obliges the neutral state to 
underline military efforts.”69 Regarding to this convention, there is no clear legal 
explanation in what extend the military forces could be used by neutral states, so that 
there are more controversies on military to military cooperation. The neutral countries’ 
military cooperation with other military forces face challenges because in contemporary 
security environment requires security interoperability among the nations. 
Neutral countries can be divided into two categories in accordance with military 
structures: neutrals with standing military forces and those without. A few permanently 
neutral states, such as Liechtenstein, Costa Rica, and Vatican City, do not have standing 
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military forces. Those countries are fully dependent on their own security from their 
neighboring countries, due to their economic challenges to support their own military 
forces. Most neutral countries have standing military forces, however. For instance, 
although Switzerland did not have a standing army until the formation of the new Swiss 
Armed Forces in the early 1990s, it did have armed forces with compulsory services, and 
the main defense system is now based on defending its sovereignty. 
Neutral policy creates challenges for military forces in light of contemporary 
collective security initiatives. Due to political and economic globalization and the 
development of sophisticated technology, the conflict environment has changed 
dramatically and threats have become transnational. All countries, whether they are big or 
small, are challenged with transnational threats and, in order to maintain peace and 
security in regionally as well as globally, nations must consider the increasing importance 
of collective security. The way of solving defense vulnerability for all states is to increase 
military cooperation with other military forces in order to enhance military capacity and 
coordinate with other militaries when facing transnational threats, such as terrorism or 
face the challenges alone. 
B. BENEFITS AND LIMITS OF NEUTRALITY 
This section examines the benefits and limitations of neutrality in general terms. 
These benefits and limits differ depending on the neutral state’s significance in geo-
politics, security environment, and own concept of neutrality.  
1. Benefits of Neutrality 
Apart from abstaining from others’ wars and assuring the sovereignty and 
territorial integrity under international law as “the territory of neutral power is inviolable, 
during the wartime”70 neutral countries have certain benefits. 
The most important, but greatly challenged, benefit of neutrality is the guarantee 
of sovereignty provided by the international law of neutrality to safeguard the 
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independence of the state in wartime. However, this guarantee requires a neutral country 
to earn credibility from the potential belligerents by reducing any ambiguity about the 
neutral country’s behavior in wartime. This is the biggest challenge for neutral countries, 
and it arises from the historical behavior of neutrals as well as the military necessities of 
belligerent states. Karsh emphasizes the foreign policy behavior of the neutral states as a 
way to build credibility so that “[t]he foreign policy objectives of the small state will be 
viewed by the external environment as synonymous with the policy of neutrality, thereby 
increasing the probability of the successful preservation of neutrality at wartime.”71 The 
neutral state has to maintain this foreign policy in peacetime within the framework of 
international law. By reinforcing the credibility of its neutrality the small state can reduce 
potential threats to its neutrality in wartime. Most neutral countries, in fact, declare their 
permanent neutrality and established bilateral or multilateral agreements with powerful 
states and potential belligerents for safeguarding their neutrality during wartime. 
Signatories also have a duty to respect these agreements and not to violate the neutrality 
in the course of war or armed conflict, and the belligerents are likely to do so if the 
neutral state has succeeded in making its neutral status credible prior to a conflict. 
The most valuable advantage of neutrality for small states is playing the go-
between or conciliator role between belligerents to settle disputes or conflicts peacefully. 
This tertiary service allows the belligerents to establish communication between them 
and settle the disputes, and neutral countries can boost their standing and reputation 
internationally in this role. Their policies as well as their efforts at international 
cooperation may gain global recognition.72 Switzerland has been an example for this 
tertiary service, and it qualified as a mediator among the belligerents to open “good 
offices” during the total wars, cold wars, and other conflicts in the twentieth century. For 
instance, during the Second World War, 35 countries requested support from the Swiss 
government in order to protect their citizens in war zones, and this country worked to 
implement laws of armed conflict during the course of war to protect military prisoners, 
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as well as the civilian population.73 In addition, Swiss-based humanitarian organizations 
contributed to this role and reputation. As Max Habicht notes, “The International Red 
Cross in Geneva also established a card index for fifteen million civilians, military 
prisoners, and lost person on whose behalf it organized searches and exchanges of vital 
information.”74 During the Cold War, Switzerland played a role for mediating between 
two conflicting power blocs such as providing supports to create different levels of 
agreements to reduce the strategic nuclear arsenals of the two powers. Furthermore, the 
first agreement between Gorbachev and Reagan, was signed in Geneva in 1985.   
Within the framework of the neutral countries’ “peace loving” policies and 
international organizations goals to maintain global peace and stability, neutral countries’ 
military personnel may participate as defense and military experts in negotiation 
procedures. There are several examples of Switzerland’s military personnel actively 
participating in such tertiary activities, including as mediation and monitoring groups in 
the Korean War, and in the First Gulf War in the Middle East (Kuwait and Iraq). 
Moreover, certain experts from the neutral countries have worked in inspection groups 
for investigations of belligerent forces and of nuclear weapons development programs.  
Furthermore, neutral states have gained the respect of and trust from powerful 
countries as well as international institutions by promoting the global peace and stability. 
Neutral countries have been responsible for conducting, supporting, and being actively 
involved in peaceful settlements of disputes as a fundamental diplomacy instrument. 
Moreover, neutral states and collective security initiatives share the same concepts and 
objectives for bringing peace to the world, so that neutrals’ active involvement in 
promoting peace within the framework of international collective institutions provides 
neutrals a role on the world stage.75 Most of the neutral countries in Europe have joined 
regional collective security organizations, such as the European Union and Organization 
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for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), based on establishing political and 
economic stability in the region, in addition to peace. Geneva and Helsinki are well-
known as centers for peace settlements and the promotion of human rights and 
humanitarian efforts, due to their active involvement in bringing peace and stability both 
in the region and globally. 
In conclusion, when states pursue neutrality they can safeguard their 
independence and sovereignty while abstaining from other countries’ conflicts. 
Moreover, neutral states can be places for establishing communications between 
belligerents in order to settle disputes peacefully; neutrals can also actively participated in 
international collective security institutions to promote diplomatic means for maintaining 
regional and global security. 
2. Limits of Neutrality 
There is still a question, however, of whether neutrality can guarantee the 
independence and sovereignty of neutral state in the case of war between powerful 
countries. There is no precise answer to this. Even small states earn the respect and trust 
of powerful states, and they can obtain guarantees of neutrality through agreements or 
treaties. Powerful states, however, when threatened by another superpower, can consider 
any agreement “a scrap of paper,” declaring pre-emptive self-defense and military 
necessity.76 Thus, neutrality cannot provide a full guarantee of sovereignty.  
Neutral countries have been greatly challenged throughout history due to 
belligerents’ uncertainty about or distrust of neutral states, as well as from pressures 
within the neutral states themselves. Depending on their fundamental concept of 
neutrality, geopolitical conditions, and the security situation in the region, neutral 
countries face certain limits and have become subjects of criticism, domestically and 
abroad, based on the rights and duties of the neutral countries.77 Although neutrals have 
contributed beneficial efforts to maintaining peace, contemporary collective security 
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always excludes the importance of neutrality.78 Moreover, as Goetschel states, neutrality 
has been losing its importance and significance, particularly after the Cold War, in the 
collective security efforts due to the contemporary conflict environment and broader 
involvement of collective security institutions for maintaining peace. Furthermore, 
neutral status makes defense cooperation is difficult, which limits neutral states’ ability to 
expand their security capacities and collaborate with other states for enhancing military 
technology; neutral foreign policy can isolate the state from international cooperation. 
For instance, Turkmenistan has challenged in its security with the border with 
Afghanistan, and it requires military assistance from the U.S; however, due to the 
neutrality the U.S. is reluctant to cooperate with Turkmenistan on this issue.79 
One of the most controversial challenges for neutral countries is whether to 
participate in sanctions against aggressors posed by powerful countries or international 
organizations such as the UN. In accordance with the international laws of neutrality 
being part of sanction is a way of violating neutrality because it is not being equally 
impartial toward belligerents. Nonetheless, most of the European neutrals, such as 
Switzerland, Sweden and Austria have been involved in certain sanctions posed by the 
UN and the European Union. They are respecting those sanctions for peace and stability 
purposes of the international community and in devotion to duty as members of the 
organization.80 However, neutral countries’ involvement in the sanctions is still 
questionable in regards to the international laws of neutrality. 
Apart from not being involved economically, in terms of trade with, or sanctions 
on potential belligerents, neutrals must observe limits on defense cooperation, such as not 
joining military alliances. The military forces of neutral state have the sole goal of 
defending their country in self-defense in regards to the international norms of neutrality. 
Yet, contemporary security challenges with transnational threats such as terrorism, cyber 
security, and violence by non-state actors require the close cooperation and 
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interoperability of the security forces among countries. Small states with limited military 
capacity would be more vulnerable facing such threats alone.  
Moreover, most small non-neutral states cooperate with other countries’ defense 
forces in order to upgrade military weapons systems since they have very limited 
capacity for development of their defense industries. Due to a lack of domestic resources, 
the state might be dependent on other powerful countries for military technology. 
Military cooperation for developing neutral states defense capabilities might be limited 
due to the international laws of neutrality. In this regard, a small neutral state may face 
great challenges in creating close cooperation with other defense forces. All military 
cooperation could be interpreted as alignment with other military forces or as cooperation 
with a belligerent in favor of defense investment, which is a violation of The Hague 
Convention V as an international law of neutrality.  
Aside from the limits on or ambiguity associated with defense cooperation, 
neutral states face an even more ambiguous position in regard to their possible integration 
within international organizations. Non-integration, though, could cause isolation or 
detachment for neutral states. Particularly, contemporary international relations require 
every country’s active involvement and contribution in the cooperative initiatives for 
maintaining world peace and stability, and all states, whether small or powerful, would 
enhance effectiveness, interstate collaboration, and decentralized cooperation of 
international organizations.81 As Kenneth W. Abbott and Duncan Snidal observe, “It is 
impossible to imagine contemporary international life without formal organization.”82 
Small neutral states stand to lose economic, political, and security competitiveness if they 
are not pursing an active foreign policy or are excluded by neutral policy from 
involvement in international organizations. 
Due to globalization, rapid development of technology, and transnational threats, 
many countries have been working to increase economic and security integration with 
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other countries, particularly in the first decade of the twenty-first century. In this regard, 
choosing to pursue neutrality would be a less effective choice for foreign policy. Some 
neutral states’ recent experiences would support this idea. Sweden, Ireland, and Finland’s 
neutral policies have come under question due to their membership in the European 
Union, and their closer relationship with military alliance NATO. 
Indeed, the benefits and limitations of neutrality remains a controversial topic 
because, depending on a country’s security strategy the country can be strengthened or 
isolated through its neutral policy. Moreover, global and regional political environments 
affect small countries’ political, security, and geopolitical situations and a policy of 
neutrality may no longer be an attractive option for protecting the sovereignty and 
stability of a small nation. 
C. POTENTIAL MOTIVATION FOR DECLARING MONGOLIA’S STATUS 
OF PERMANENT NEUTRALITY 
Historically, Mongolia fought a long struggle to gain its identity and sovereignty. 
Since then, like many other small countries located near powerful countries, Mongolia 
defines its foreign policy very carefully, and it has pursued neutral foreign and defense 
policies since 1992. Nevertheless, it is still difficult to achieve a straightforward 
understanding of President Tsakhiagiin Elbegdorj’s impetus to declare a status of 
permanent neutrality for Mongolia 
1. Mongolia’s Legal Fundamentals and Proposal 
Mongolia has constituted its foreign policy under Chapter 1 of the Constitution of 
Mongolia as, “Mongolia shall adhere to the universally recognized norms and principles 
of international law and pursue a peaceful foreign policy.”83 According to her 
constitution, Mongolia prohibits stationing of foreign military on its territory; it even 
prohibits transferring foreign military through her border and territory. Mongolia has 
military forces for her territorial integrity and self-defense, allowed by her constitution, 
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and military power is based solely on homeland security. Furthermore, Mongolia is a 
non-alliance and an internationally recognized nuclear weapon free state.84 
The National Security Concept of Mongolia is a national strategic document, 
which it states that, as a principle of its sovereignty, Mongolia must always use soft 
power as political and diplomatic means to ensure its independence and sovereignty.85 
Furthermore, as her Concept of Mongolia’s Foreign Policy states, Mongolia pursues an 
open, multi-pillar, and non-aligned foreign policy. It also asserts that, “The priority of 
Mongolia’s foreign policy shall be safeguarding of its security and vital national interests 
by political and diplomatic means, and creating a favorable external environment for its 
economic, scientific and technological development.”86 In addition, the recently renewed 
Basics of Mongolia’s Defense Policy states that Mongolia is willing to neither join any 
military alliances nor take part in armed confrontation unless Mongolia counters a 
military threat and Mongolia does not allow having foreign military stationed on its 
territory, or foreign military through its land or air spaces.87  
All these laws meet the requirement of The Hague Convention V and it is 
interpreted as a neutral policy. In his September 2015 address presenting the offer for the 
Parliament to discuss declaring permanent neutrality status, the president emphasized the 
aforementioned legal perspectives meet the stance of neutrality.88 Furthermore, according 
to him, Mongolia needs to shape and validate its foreign policy by declaring the status of 
permanent neutrality.89  
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The president also asserted that history, geographic location, and Mongolia’s 
future are consistent with the fundamental principles of neutrality. According to him, 
neutrality encourages Mongolia to develop equal and balanced relationships with other 
countries because all the nations and global and regional organizations respect the 
permanent neutral policy.90  
In addition, the president emphasized that neutrality is the most stable policy over 
time. Due to constant and dramatic change in international affairs and world order, states’ 
policies have also had to change. Neutrality is stable, because states can maintain their 
neutrality policy by amending, renewing, and even abandoning it without any other 
countries’ involvement.  
Mongolia plans to adopt a law establishing a status of permanent neutrality. The 
law would be enforced by the UN General Assembly resolution, following the same 
process as Turkmenistan, so that all the member states respect Mongolia’s recognized 
status of neutrality.  
Declaring a permanent status of neutrality might be a simple procedure; however, 
maintaining a status of permanent neutrality, particularly in the defense sector, will not 
easy. Due to her location and geo-political situation, neutrality causes Mongolia to be 
detached from international politics and the political interests of current cooperating 
countries including neighbors.  
2. Regional Security Environment 
The law will be enforced by the UN General Assembly resolution, following the 
same process as Turkmenistan, so that all the member states respect Mongolia’s 
recognized status of neutrality.  
Declaring a permanent status of neutrality might be a simple procedure; however, 
maintaining a status of permanent neutrality, particularly in the defense sector, will not 
easy. Three major economies and three military superpower states, as Russian Federation, 
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People’s Republic of China and the United States, are located in the region. Although the 
security situation is comparatively stable, the region has several potential security 
challenges.91 These security challenges include, but are not limited to the following 
issues. 
Continued and unsettled territorial disputes are present in the region. For instance, 
China has disputed territorial claims with most of its neighboring countries to its west and 
south, including the South China Sea. In addition, Russia has territorial disputes with 
Japan over the Kuril Islands and other conflicts with its western and southern neighbors.  
Potential transnational violent extremism in the region, due to the diversity of the 
population, religion, politics, and economics, causes instability in the region and 
transnational threats among the states. 
Powerful countries in the region, Russia and China, extend their military 
capabilities, modernization, and develop advanced military technology. Moreover, 
Russia, China, the United States, and India have nuclear weapons, and several other 
countries have potential to develop nuclear weapons. 
Overall, regional security coordination has been quite weak in Asia. There is no 
single security cooperation organization or institution present in the region to maintain 
the security. Regional disputes related to security are limited to only diplomatic talks or 
discussions during the regional meetings.92 States in the region are not closely 
cooperating due to their different political interests, which are based on competing 
political ideologies. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization, led by China and Russia, 
has only six member states, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has ten 
member states. Lack of Asian security cooperation threatens constant instability and non-
settlement of the territorial disputes.  
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The Asia-Pacific region is experiencing potential transnational threats as well, 
such as terrorism, international criminal activities including drug and human trafficking, 
and many other human security challenges by non-state actors crossing borders among 
the states. Moreover, there are threats from the proliferation of all types of weapons and 
potential threats from developing and proliferating sensitive technologies for weapons, 
including nuclear weapons, by state and non-state actors.  
Within the strategic security environment, Mongolia is a country of East Asia and 
is situated between two of the world’s most powerful countries with which it has close 
strategic partnerships and cooperation. At the same time, Mongolia is trying to choose to 
be a permanently neutral state. It is a very surprising stance since there is no potential 
threat to Mongolian security; however, both neighbors have potential disregard for other 
regional countries’ behavior.  
According to the Concept of the Foreign Policy of Mongolia, “Mongolia will not 
interfere in the disputes between two neighboring countries …”93 Not only will Mongolia 
void interfering in disputes between its two neighboring countries, it is not required to 
intervene in conflicts or disputes either of its neighbors may have with other states in the 
region. Mongolia is not a member of any military alliances and is an overall alliance-free 
country. The Mongolian Armed Forces have defending its sovereignty and territorial 
integrity as a main objective. A secondary objective of the Mongolian Armed Forces is 
participating in peace support operations, for defining Mongolia’s diplomatic position on 
maintaining global peace and stability as a member of United Nations; they maintain 
close coordination and cooperation with neighboring countries as well as other European 
and regional countries’ military forces, in order to enhance its military peacekeeping 
capacity and interoperability.94 
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As the president has stated, “It is not necessary for a state to seek support from 
any particular country or international organization to validate its neutrality status quo.”95 
Both Mongolia’s neighboring countries are greater players in the international arena; both 
have nuclear weapons and powerful military forces with modern technology; moreover, 
Mongolia’s neighbors are members of the United Nations Security Council. As such, they 
would have a great impact on Mongolia’s future neutrality.  
Moreover, Mongolia would discuss joining The Hague Convention V, if it 
declares its permanent neutrality, in order to be protected by the international law. If 
Mongolia joins the convention, the country would be responsible for carrying out the law 
and to have certain rights with certain duties. As noted previously, this law would restrict 
certain policies, but this law is quite outdated. Nevertheless, no country has tried to 
update the law since the neutral policy itself has become less attractive and the number of 
neutral states is declining.96 Furthermore, only two neighboring countries will be close 
guarantors for Mongolia’s neutrality, and they would determine whether to support 
Mongolia or to make Mongolia isolated or detached from rest of the world.  
Based on constitutional legacy, Mongolia has implemented neutral security and 
foreign policies since its adoption of the new constitution in 1992. It is not clear what the 
real benefits for declaring a permanently neutral status would be. According to the 
president’s proposal, Mongolia can reshape its current foreign policy since it has not been 
clear in its position. Moreover, Mongolia can be a regional player, and Mongolia can be a 
neutral economic center in East Asia since it is permanently neutral. A permanently 
neutral foreign policy would have an impact on all of Mongolia’s security sectors, 
particularly defense cooperation. Mongolia’s defense cooperation, military capability, 
and interoperability have greatly been enhanced since it has participated in the UN and 
coalition peace operations. Continued defense sector cooperation would face potential 
challenges due to the permanent neutral policy. The challenges to defense cooperation 
will center on cooperation with NATO and some developing countries, as well as with 
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China’s and Russia’s military forces in order to enhance military capacity. The following 
chapters will discuss the challenges and analyze the potential challenges on defense 
cooperation in Mongolia. 
D. CONCLUSION 
As Christine Agius observes, “Neutrality belonged to the era of bloc tensions, 
territorial sovereignty and conflict between states.”97 Today, most countries prefer to 
settle the disputes through peaceful and diplomatic means by close coordination with 
regional and international organizations. Furthermore, many traditionally neutral 
countries are challenged by the interdependence and globalization of security and 
economic factors and the need for close cooperation of states to fight against 
transnational threats. 
Since the end of Cold War, small states have changed from their approach to 
balancing or “bandwagoning” with powerful states; instead they have focused more on 
getting involved in and increasing their roles in the international organizations for 
maintaining global and regional peace and security, as the main actors in the 
contemporary international system.98 Particularly, contemporary security environments 
and transnational threats require close coordination and cooperation among the military 
forces of countries in spite of their size. In this regard, neutrality is no longer a timely 
subject to discuss. Moreover, most of the small states that tried to become permanently 
neutral since the end of the Cold War, such as Turkmenistan, and some traditionally 
neutral countries, such as Finland and Sweden, comes under the questions on their 
neutrality. 
According to the realist power balance theory, there are no external threats, no 
territorial disputes, and no intrigues to Mongolia from its only two powerful neighboring 
countries. Even in the worst case scenario, Mongolia has no ability to counter a physical 
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threat with its small armed forces and limited capabilities. Thus, Mongolia has no interest 
in having any type of conflicts with anyone. 
Jargalsaikham Mendee states that, “The most logical and pragmatic way to 
survive in this complicated and rapidly changing landscape, and balance multiple 
political and economic aims is not to freeze the country’s pragmatic foreign policy via 
permanent neutrality, but instead strengthen its links to global, regional and bilateral 
structures.”99 Whether Mongolia can successfully implement neutral policy or not is still 
debatable. From a military perspective, however, there is no regional collective security 
organization in East Asia that can support Mongolia’s neutrality like European neutrals 
have enjoyed with ideological support from European Union, NATO, and other 
international organizations.  
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III. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE NEUTRAL 
COUNTRIES AND THEIR EXPERIENCES 
Since Chapter II explains the main concepts of neutrality and Mongolia's proposal 
to potentially pursue permanent neutrality status, Chapter III examines the defense and 
security policies of neutral countries. In supporting the main argument about potential 
effects of permanent neutral status on Mongolia’s defense cooperation, analysis of these 
defense and security policies are based on the neutral states with armed forces. This 
chapter analyzes the security policies and defense cooperation of Switzerland, Austria, 
and Turkmenistan as model neutral states, while examining the defense policy and 
defense cooperation of Finland and Sweden, which have dramatically increased their 
cooperation with NATO while maintaining neutrality.  
A. SWITZERLAND’S SECURITY POLICIES, AND ITS DEFENSE 
COOPERATION 
Switzerland has the longest history of being permanently neutral, and its 
neutrality has fully integrated into the country’s identity. The Swiss pursuit of neutrality 
status dates back to the battle of Marignano in 1515, after a long struggle to avoid 
becoming part of neighboring countries’ wars. Finally powerful European states, France, 
Austria, Great Britain, Prussia, and Russia, in the nineteenth century recognized 
Switzerland's permanent status of neutrality and guaranteed its territorial integrity 
through the Treaty of Paris in 1815.100 The country has benefited from permanent 
neutrality as an instrument by securing national solidarity since Switzerland has diverse 
of ethnicity; offering Swiss “good services” as a mediator among conflicting parties to 
settle disputes peacefully; and getting security guarantees from powerful countries in case 
of conflict situations. Critically, Switzerland, a non-aligned, neutral state, has its own 
military forces to preserve its sovereignty and territorial integrity. 
Switzerland's security behavior has changed due to the changes in the world’s 
security environment. Switzerland had developed military forces based on mandatory 
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military conscription; however, they maintained no standing army until the end of the 
Cold War. Since 1990, Switzerland has conducted military transformations in its armed 
forces like many other European countries due to the changed security environment. One 
of these transformations is close cooperation with collective security organizations, 
which includes military alliance with NATO. Swiss military forces have participated in 
NATO-led peace support operations while it continues participation in UN peacekeeping, 
promoting peace and security in the region while developing its own military 
interoperability. 
Switzerland developed defensive military forces without a standing army based 
on the self-defense capacity of neutrality in the case of threats. According to the Federal 
Constitution of Switzerland of 1874, Switzerland did not have standing military forces, 
and it had armed forces organized as militia or reserve personnel.101 Even though this 
state did not have standing military forces, it developed high capability to deploy a huge 
number of military personnel predominantly composed of conscripts in a short period of 
time when necessary. For instance, the Swiss Army was able to mobilize 625,000 troops 
with four fully equipped army corps and 300 aircraft support from Swiss air forces at the 
end of the Cold War, in order to defend its sovereignty and neutrality as self-defense 
from potential enemies.102 That was the height of their capacity. 
In the twentieth century, Switzerland's neutrality was viewed as a positive 
security survival policy for a small state, particularly in light of the two world wars, and 
most significantly in considering the competing economic and political ideologies 
represented in the Cold War. During the Cold War, Switzerland's main foreign policy 
was based on key neutrality principles including not joining and coordinating with any 
military and political alliances; however, the state actively developed economic 
cooperation with other countries and participated in global humanitarian, peace, and 
stability activities. According to Andreas Wenger, in terms of Swiss foreign policy during 
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the Cold War, Switzerland increased its economic interests through cooperation while 
reducing security cooperation with other countries.103 Wenger also asserts that Swiss 
promotion of economic development caused Switzerland to neglect its defense and 
military policy as part of Swiss foreign policy. The foreign policy was dominantly based 
on foreign trade and economic cooperation policy.104 Swiss defense cooperation was 
limited.  
Switzerland deployed its first company-size military force to the Neutral Nations 
Supervisory Commission in the Korean War; the commission’s main task was to 
supervise the armistice between the two Korean military forces. Furthermore, Swiss 
military have participated in UN peacekeeping operations since 1960, with a limited 
number of personnel and only in UN-mandated peacekeeping operations. Swiss military 
personnel have served the UN military observers mainly as experts, medical, and logistic 
personnel in UN peacekeeping operations. Switzerland’s participation in military 
operations is still limited due to the neutrality policy. Due to Switzerland’s peace loving 
initiatives and offering “good offices” for settling any disputes or conflicts peacefully, 
Switzerland has become an esteemed diplomatic state and home of international 
organizations in Europe. Although Switzerland joined the UN in 2002 after a referendum 
on becoming a member, the state had been an active player in UN peace promotion 
initiatives with modest participation in peacekeeping operations.  
The basic military strategic objective of the Swiss defense was convincing 
possible adversaries that occupying or conquering Switzerland would cost them a lot and 
be nearly impossible. The Swiss citizens have been supportive of these objectives during 
the era of total wars. Furthermore, Switzerland has high potential to produce its own 
armament and military equipment. For instance, the BRÜGGER & THOMET series of 
submachine gun, SIG SAUER series of semi-automatic pistols and rifles, military trucks 
made by SAURER MOTORS, and MOWAG PIRANHA family of armored fighting 
                                                 
103 Andreas Wenger, “Swiss Security Policy: From Autonomy to Co-Operation,” in Swiss Foreign 
Policy, 1945–2002, ed. Jurg Martin Gabriel and Thomas Fischer (UK: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 28. 
104 Ibid., 29. 
 44
vehicles are productions of the Swiss military industries. Military armaments are mainly 
of domestic origin and manufactured at state owned and private armament companies of 
Switzerland; however, the state is not able to produce all military supplies on its own.105 
In this regard, Swiss military has purchased foreign military equipment in order to 
enhance its military capacity, but mainly from Western countries including the United 
States. Together with high numbers of well-equipped military personnel, highly fortified 
man-made and natural defensive areas of the Alpine mountains provide a daunting 
prospect to any potential adversary.106 
During the Cold War, Switzerland’s military forces maintained their capacity to 
defend the country, particularly against potential offensive operations by Warsaw Pact 
countries.107 Switzerland was well integrated into the Western political, economic, and 
technological sphere compared to Soviet bloc countries. Furthermore, powerful Western 
countries, especially the United States, obtained Switzerland’s willingness to support the 
Western bloc’s embargo against the Eastern bloc through diplomatic and economic 
pressure.108 In this regard, Swiss military had access to military equipment and know-
how on military technology from the Western countries without joining their alliances. 
This dependence and informal behavior of Switzerland brought its neutrality into 
question.109 
As have other countries in the world, Switzerland has conducted military 
transformation in its military forces based on the new security threats and challenges that 
emerged at the end of the twentieth century. Due to globalization, every state has had 
similar concerns regarding common complex and diverse transnational threats such as 
terrorism, asymmetric threats by state and non-state actors, cyber security, illegal 
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immigration or mass refugees, and natural disaster and environmental problems in the 
current century. As Ian K. Adam states, “Globalization has encouraged formerly 
unattainable aspirations in developing countries with the effect that increased cooperation 
is essential for future progress.”110 Switzerland renewed its security policy based on the 
evolved global security environment of the first decade of this century.  
In the early 2000s, Switzerland developed a new security strategy, “Security 
through Cooperation,” that motivates Swiss military cooperation with other countries and 
alliances for mitigating military self-defense challenges. As Wegner asserts, 
“Participation, rather than neutrality or an independent national defense strategy, will 
safeguard the government’s freedom of action in today’s political environment, which is 
characterized by transnational problems.”111 Swiss Armed Forces have implemented a 
reform, Army XXI, to reduce the number of the military reserve forces, and develop 
professional military forces with enhanced training through cooperation with other 
countries. Furthermore, participating in the activity of promoting peace and stability has 
become one of the three main missions of the Swiss Armed Forces along with defending 
its sovereignty and territorial integrity, supporting the civilian authority, and promoting 
peace within an international context.112 
Switzerland is not a member of the EU and NATO; nonetheless, it cooperates 
closely with those organizations. Swiss personnel have participated, as previously 
mentioned, in peace support operations only under the UN Security Council or the 
Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) mandated operations in 
accordance with the Swiss Military law of 1995.113 Moreover, Swiss Armed Forces have 
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participated in the NATO and OSCE-led peace support operations with limited number of 
personnel. For instance, Swiss military, with a limited number of personnel, participated 
in OSCE-led peace operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and NATO-led operations in 
Kosovo and Afghanistan, because the UN Security Council mandated those operations to 
their respective security organizations. Furthermore, Switzerland is an active member of 
an European Union (EU), OSCE, and Partnership for Peace (PfP) program run by NATO 
to promote regional and global peace and stability. However, Switzerland still maintains 
only modest participation in military operations; no full-size combat military units have 
deployed in the peace operations due to Swiss neutrality.114 The UN peacekeeping 
operations require more robust military operations due to the global common security 
challenges. In this regard, Switzerland still keeps modest participation in peacekeeping 
operations while actively developing cooperation in order to enhance its military 
interoperability, contributing its efforts for collaborative security and military training. 
International military cooperation is an essential element for the Swiss Armed 
Forces to enhance its military interoperability and to be part of the international solutions 
to transnational threats. Furthermore, Switzerland and other European neutral states 
cooperate with NATO through the PfP program, and they explain that this cooperation is 
compatible with neutrality policy. According to Andrew Cottey, the PfP is compatible 
with neutrality: not requiring states to be a member of NATO; not involving alliance 
planning activities; and not requiring deployment of military force.115 Also, as Andrey 
states, “The PfP is not an organization but an instrument, the main advantages of which 
are the principles of voluntary participation and self-differentiation.”116 Switzerland, as 
have other European neutral states, has benefited through the cooperation by enhancing 
its security capacity and military interoperability through the exchange of training and 
experience with other PfP members; contributing its initiative to deal with contemporary 
                                                 
114 Ibid. 
115 Andrew Cottey, “The European Neutrals and NATO: Ambiguous Partnership,” Contemporary 
Security Policy 34, no. 3 (2013): 457, doi:10.1080/13523260.2013.842295. 
116 Andrey, “Security Implications of Neutrality,” 85. 
 47
security challenges; and mitigating security challenges through multilateral efforts.117 
NATO also benefits not only its members by their participation in security related 
cooperation but also non-member states as it extends its influence globally. Beyond its 
work with NATO, Switzerland maintains modest military cooperation with other military 
forces. For instance, Swiss military cooperates with other countries military forces, 
including NATO members, only in training and developing interoperability levels. 
Switzerland’s neutrality has been counted as a successful implementation of 
permanent neutrality for the longest time, and its neutrality is a main foreign policy 
instrument. Swiss neutrality has imposed a quality of aloofness on Swiss military 
interaction with other military forces. Although neutral, Switzerland developed massive 
military forces to protect its sovereignty in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. During 
this time, Switzerland has developed military forces composed predominantly of 
conscripts and developed military industries to produce most of its own military 
equipment. Switzerland, as have many other European countries, has countered 
contemporary security challenges, such as transnational threats, through close 
cooperation with other countries and integrated efforts. In this regard, the Swiss military 
cooperates with other countries military forces, as well as NATO through PfP program, 
to enhance its capacity to deal with contemporary security threats. However, as 
contemporary security circumstances demand that countries cooperate more extensively 
and substantively, the limits on cooperation posed by neutrality and related international 
law—particularly in security areas—may marginalize Switzerland.118 At the same time, 
the active engagement with NATO by other European neutral countries, such as Austria, 
Finland, and Sweden, has become a debatable issue among the scholars, in regard to how 
that cooperation with NATO calls into question the neutrality of these states. 
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B. OTHER EUROPEAN NEUTRAL COUNTRIES DEFENSE POLICIES 
AND THEIR DEFENSE COOPERATION 
Other European neutral states, Austria, Finland, and Sweden, chose to become 
neutrals based on their security situation, particularly during conflicts among the 
powerful countries in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. In addition, since all of them 
are democracies, they formulate their military doctrine and integrate their military culture 
into the Western military sphere. Since the Cold War ended, those European neutrals 
have developed military cooperation with the regional military alliance, NATO, without 
joining the alliance as members. And, the neutrality of Austria, Finland, and Sweden has 
come under question due to their closer relationship with NATO. 
1. Austria 
In 1955, Austria chose to become a neutral state in order to regain its sovereignty 
from the World War II victorious countries. Due to its neutrality, Austria succeeded in 
ending the Allied occupation and became a buffer state between NATO and Warsaw Pact 
allies. As Spring emphasizes, “[Austrian neutrality] was also a sign of anti-fascism, anti-
socialism, and anti-Germanism. It was a measure to find a new national identity that was 
detached from east and west as well as from the historical trauma of the Second World 
War.”119 
In contrast to Swiss permanent neutrality, Austrian permanent neutrality has 
closely integrated into the international collective security organizations. Austria joined 
the UN in 1955, the same year it declared its intention to pursue neutrality and developed 
its neutrality policy concept, “active neutrality.” According to active neutrality policy, 
Austria would actively engage in and develop cooperation with other countries and 
international security organizations.120 Later, Austria not only became a member of the 
UN, it also earned a seat as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council in 
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1973–1974, 1991–1992, and 2009–2010.121 Austrian Armed Forces have participated in 
peace and stability operations as an important task of being part of the international 
community, particularly the UN peacekeeping operations since 1960. Austria was one of 
the leading contributors of troops to the UN peacekeeping operations, as second and fifth 
largest contributor, before 1990. It deployed not only experts and staff officers to UN 
peacekeeping operations, but also deployed infantry battalions to the UN missions in 
Cyprus in 1971, UNEF in Egypt in 1973, and assigned an infantry battalion to the UN 
Standby Arrangement System until 1990.122 
After the Cold War ended, Austria joined the EU and has cooperated with NATO 
through the PfP program since 1995 as other neutral countries, such as Ireland, 
Switzerland, and Sweden have done, in order to enhance its capability and 
interoperability. Austrian military personnel have taken part in UN peacekeeping 
operations, also in the OSCE, EU, and NATO organized peace operations such as the 
NATO-led operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo.  Recently Austria deployed 
infantry battalion to the EU-led operation in Chad, and has currently deployed a few staff 
officers in Afghanistan. The Austrian National Security Council did not approve Austrian 
military participation in the operation in Iraq, because the operation was not within the 
framework of international law and UN approval. The council activated the law of 
Austrian neutrality, and it was part of Austrian permanent neutrality status.123 
Moreover, Austrian Armed Forces implemented reforms in 2005 that let Austria 
reduce its conscription and increase its professional military forces with more mobile, 
professional units. Also, the armed forces main doctrine has changed from area defense 
to domestic disaster relief, and peace support operations and disaster relief and 
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humanitarian operations abroad.124 Austria still maintains its neutrality while developing 
security policy toward international security cooperation. Austria has contributed and still 
has the potential to contribute extensive numbers of military forces to the UN, NATO, 
and EU-led peace operations, including infantry battalions, special operations units, 
logistic and support units such as medical, engineering, and air support elements. 
According to Austrian security strategy assessment, Austria is vulnerable to transnational 
threats and potential domestic disaster relief capacity, and Austria’s main security 
strategy is based on international cooperation particularly in regional security 
organizations. 
2. Finland 
Finland initially became a neutral state after gaining its independence from Russia 
in 1917. Finland pursues the neutral policy and has tried to maintain its sovereignty under 
the neutrality, but neutrality has not provided sovereignty to Finland throughout its 
history. Finland engage in war against the Soviet Union’s invasion in the early stage of 
World War II, joined the German Axis power to fight against the Soviet Union for 
survival, and fought against the Axis power alongside the Alliance power at the end of 
the war. After World War II, Finland continued its neutral policy and succeeded in 
having Soviet troops withdraw from its territory in 1955 and joined the United Nations in 
same year. 
During the Cold War, Finland initiated the Nordic Nuclear Weapons Free Zone to 
restrict nuclear weapons in the region when leading NATO and Warsaw Pact countries 
escalated the production of weapons of mass destruction. After the Cold War, Finland 
implemented military transformation as other neutrals have done and reduced its 
conscript-based armed forces, but it still maintains a larger military due to the potential 
threat from Russia. Thus, territorial defense is still considered a main task. Finland 
decreased its military from 730,000 to 540,000 in 1994, to 430,000 in 1997, and 250,000 
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in 2009, respectfully.125 Finland joined the EU and has cooperated with NATO through 
PfP since 1994. In addition, Finland cooperates closely with the Swedish-led Nordic 
Defense Co-Operation. This is cooperation among Sweden, Finland, and Norway in the 
areas of arms procurement, training, and research.126 
Finland has participated in UN peacekeeping operations, as well as EU and 
NATO-led peace support operations in Kosovo, and recently in Afghanistan. Finland and 
Sweden have increased military cooperation with NATO and its member states, including 
actively participating in NATO military exercises.127 Finland has cooperation with all 
European countries, including Russia, for purchasing and selling its military equipment 
as well, since the country has strong potential for military industry.  
Finland, together with Sweden, develops military cooperation with NATO and its 
member states, and these activities have increased dramatically. As Marco Wyss states, 
Finland together with Sweden still maintains military neutrality and NATO membership 
still remains open. By increasing their military cooperation with NATO, Finland and 
Sweden have drawn the attention of Russia, and Russian officials have criticized 
Finland’s and Sweden’s potentially seeking membership in NATO.128 Although Finland 
and Sweden are increasing cooperation and deepening their partnership with NATO, they 
are not seeking membership in the organization. However, Russian critics and threats of 
military retaliation could cause the countries to consider joining NATO to receive 
potential protection under NATO membership.129 
Finland still commits its main security to territorial defense and international 
cooperation in order to defend its sovereignty and build capacity against transnational 
threats. It does so through cooperation with security organizations while enhancing 
military capacity on territorial defense. In this regard, Finland still maintains stronger 
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military forces consisting of conscripts while developing cooperation with NATO 
through PfP, the EU, OSCE, and Nordic Defense Cooperation.  
3. Sweden 
Sweden initiated a policy of neutrality in the nineteenth century due to the 
regional security concerns. Sweden was among the powerful states that included Russia, 
Prussia, and Great Britain, and it lacked the military strength to sustain its sovereignty. 
Although Sweden first chose to pursue a policy of impartiality in the early nineteenth 
century, it renewed this policy later during the Crimean War. Finally, the first war 
between Germany and Denmark caused Sweden to follow the neutrality policy that 
Spring refers to as “factual permanent neutrality.”130  Sweden’s neutrality is more 
ambiguous than other neutralities due to its behavior during the World War II, and its 
closer cooperation with the military alliance of NATO. 
Furthermore, Sweden’s neutrality is not as permanent as Swiss neutrality. One of 
the reasons for this would be the geopolitical situation in Northern Europe, particularly in 
the first half of the twentieth century. After World War I, Sweden directly joined the 
League of Nations and played active role in the collective security organization. During 
World War II, Sweden remained a neutral state; however, the Wehrmacht violated 
Swedish neutrality and moved its military forces through the territory of the neutral state. 
As Spring asserts, “Swedish people were of the opinion that it was the lesser evil for 
Scandinavia as a whole that Sweden had to accept some violations of the laws of 
neutrality in order to stay out of the conflict.”131  Sweden adopted neutrality during war 
time and maintained neutrality as a non-alignment policy, but was actively involved in 
international cooperation toward peace and stability. Particularly, Sweden has always 
maintained close cooperation with its regional or Nordic countries. Sweden joined the 
UN in 1946 and at the same time joined Nordic countries defense alliances, but Sweden 
did not continue this membership when Denmark and Norway joined NATO as members. 
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Sweden faced greater challenges after the World War II when the ideological 
division had occurred. Due to its geographic location, Sweden was a buffer zone between 
communism and capitalism. Sweden chose to closely integrate with the Western bloc as a 
democratic state, and it developed a closer relationship with NATO while maintaining 
neutrality. Moreover, Sweden developed a closer relationship with the UN, and this 
relationship became one of the important roles associated with Swedish security policy. 
Sweden was the first neutral state elected as a non-permanent member of the UN Security 
Council in 1957–1958, and was later elected again two more times in 1975–1976 and 
1997–1998. Sweden was an active player in UN peacekeeping activities, usually acting as 
mediator of various conflicts and chairing multilateral discussions, particularly when the 
two contradicting blocs were involved.  
With regard to military forces, Sweden maintained self-defense military forces, 
predominantly composed of conscriptions, until 2000. Main military doctrine was based 
on defending territorial integrity sovereignty and neutrality, using deterrence and 
dissuasion that would make any invasion by Sweden’s potential adversaries too costly. 
Sweden also has a strong potential for military industries as developed as Switzerland.  
Beyond its borders, Sweden has contributed its military forces to UN 
peacekeeping operations since 1953 during the Korean War and further extended its 
contribution with infantry battalions in the UN peacekeeping efforts in Congo and Egypt. 
Sweden’s military deployment has only been in UN-led military operations; however, 
this contribution policy was changed in the 1990s when Sweden contributed its military 
forces to NATO and EU-led missions in the Balkans, Afghanistan, and now in Libya. 
After the 1990s, Swedish participation in UN peacekeeping operations has decreased as 
has the participation of other European neutrals. They have more interest in cooperating 
with the EU and NATO than in UN peacekeeping operations, since there is more 
possibility to enhance military interoperability and capacity. 
After the Cold War ended, Sweden reformed its security policy and transformed 
its military forces toward the new security environment. Sweden joined the EU in 1995 
and has cooperated closely with NATO through the PfP program. Security policy has 
shifted from a single approach concentrated on territorial defense to include international 
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peace building and domestic disaster relief. Sweden has reduced the number of standing 
military personnel; however, Sweden has enlarged its numbers of professional military 
personnel while it gradually abolished conscription by 2010. Sweden has underlined the 
importance of security cooperation to enhance interoperability, strategic mobility, and 
joint operations. Furthermore, Sweden military develops closer cooperation with NATO, 
has even participated in various NATO exercises, and it has caused Russia to worry about 
NATO’s potential enlargement in the region.132  
Sweden’s active participation in the EU and NATO security initiatives, including 
its increased military activities within the framework of NATO, calls into question 
Sweden’s neutrality. As Spring observes, “Swedish position [has changed] to a status of 
military non-alignment, the country no longer counts as a factual neutral state. Their 
policy of neutrality has become irrelevant as it failed to provide an appropriate 
international role in the post-Cold War era.”133 Sweden still remains as a non-aligned 
country while it closely cooperates with NATO and other regional security organizations 
without membership, for the purposes of enhancing its security.  
C. TURKMENISTAN’S PERMANENT NEUTRALITY AND DEFENSE 
COOPERATION  
Turkmenistan is one of the sovereign states resulting from the disintegration of 
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and has pursued “positive neutral” foreign policy 
since 1995. Turkmenistan has chosen to be a permanently neutral country due to the 
geopolitical situation in the region, the necessity of internal solidarity and isolation from 
the external potential threats, and for building political and economic independence from 
powerful countries in relation to its rich natural resources.134 After Turkmenistan’s 
independence in 1991, the country faced security instability challenges in the region. Its 
neighboring country Uzbekistan had suffered internal conflicts including civil war. 
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Afghanistan encountered the Taliban regime that created instability not only in 
Afghanistan but also in the Central Asian region. It also caused global instability. Today, 
Turkmenistan has maritime border disputes over Caspian resources with its Caspian 
neighboring countries of Iran and Azerbaijan. Moreover, Turkmenistan’s economic 
independence and need for mutually beneficial economic relations with other countries 
have been crucial due to Turkmenistan’s hydrocarbon rich natural resource. Considering 
all these challenges and Turkmenistan’s authoritarian political structure, the country 
sought to become a permanently neutral country and a non-aligned state determined to 
avoid the influence of powerful countries on its economy and politics. 
Neutrality causes certain countries to abstain from international cooperation. 
Turkmenistan’s neutrality has become a reason for the country’s isolation or for its 
limited access to multilateral economic and security cooperation with other countries. 
Turkmenistan’s neutrality allows multiple bilateral relations to be maintained rather than 
multilateral cooperation. This causes isolation and prevents Turkmenistan from 
interacting with other states through multilateral approaches.135 This isolation, though, is 
largely self-imposed and can be attributed to the interests of its ruling party; as Barbara 
Kiepenheuer-Drechsler states, the political leaders use neutrality as a tool to create 
seclusion of the state from international development for their own regime’s benefit of 
the country.136 
Turkmenistan has not been part of Russia’s initiatives to build economic and 
defense multilateral norms such as The Eurasian Economic Community, Collective 
Treaty Organization, and Shanghai Cooperation Organization.137 Nevertheless, 
Turkmenistan’s bilateral economic cooperation with other countries, including China and 
Russia, has been comparatively successful for the economy of Turkmenistan. Moreover, 
bilateral cooperation with neighboring countries has enabled Turkmenistan to become a 
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hub of regional trade and transportation through its rich natural resource based 
economy.138 For instance, Turkmenistan started building a pipeline in 2015 to transfer 
natural gas from the Caspian Sea to Pakistan and further to India through Afghanistan. In 
contrast, defense cooperation has been limited due to the neutrality policy. 
Potential instability in countries in this region, led Turkmenistan under President 
Niyazov to pursue a unilateral defense policy. Turkmenistan has developed limited 
cooperation with NATO through the PfP program, but only for training. Turkmenistan 
maintains its own military forces, composed of army, navy and air forces, in order to 
protect the country’s territorial integrity and sovereignty. Turkmenistan joined NATO’s 
PfP program in 1994 as the first Central Asian country in order to get the benefits of 
military interoperability. However, due to Turkmenistan’s commitment to the neutrality 
policy, this cooperation has remained limited. Within these limits, some officials attend 
meetings and NATO organized training. Turkmenistan usually sends its personnel as 
observers to civilian emergency, scientific, and environmental training organized by 
NATO. In 2002, Turkmenistan hosted the civil emergency training in Ashgabat.139 In 
addition, in 2003, Turkmenistan connected to NATO’s Virtual Silk Highway computer 
networking project for Caucasus and Central Asia. However, Ashgabat still does not want 
to coordinate with NATO and other partners through multilateral cooperation. 
Furthermore, Turkmenistan does not contribute its military forces to any peacekeeping 
activities. 
The Armed Forces of Turkmenistan consist of both contracted and conscripted 
personnel; according to Turkmenistan’s constitution all males must fulfill two years of 
compulsory military service.140 Aside from the limits placed on them by neutrality, the 
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Armed Forces of Turkmenistan have faced difficult challenges due to internal corruption 
and financial difficulties. Furthermore, they have few opportunities for defense 
cooperation. Until recently, the Armed Forces of Turkmenistan have limited coordination 
with Russian military, and only in the field of military training and technical assistance.  
However, recent developments in the regional situation, radical activities, and 
transnational threats in the region have caused Turkmenistan to initiate military 
cooperation and deepen its military ties with Russia, the United States, and other 
potential powerful countries. As John C. K. Daly emphasizes, “Regional events, 
however, have recently caused Ashgabat to solicit international perceptions of Central 
Asia’s evolving strategic dynamics, causing Turkmenistan to cautiously reach out to 
potential foreign partners, despite this country’s neutralist policies.”141 He also states that 
Russia cooperates with Turkmenistan to provide military training and a military-to-
military relationship.142 Furthermore, Turkmenistan is developing a military cooperation 
with China to combat terrorism as part of a strategic partnership agreement signed 
between the two countries in September 2013.143 Regional stability, particularly in 
connection with Afghanistan’s instability, brings Turkmenistan to pursue active and 
cooperative measures on security because the state has not been able to deal with security 
issues alone for the last few decades. 
In conclusion, the positive neutrality of Turkmenistan is based on rejecting the 
influence of powerful countries, particularly the Russian Federation, on the country’s 
economic independence. Moreover, the regional security situation has deterred 
Turkmenistan from developing its resource rich economy. Regional instability and 
Turkmenistan’s political structure have strongly affected its positive neutral foreign 
policy forcing it to become an isolationist policy. Although Turkmenistan has developed 
active diplomacy based on bilateral cooperation with other countries for economic 
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development since 2007, the state’s security relationship is still not actively engaged in 
the framework of international security cooperation. Recently, however, Turkmenistan 
initiated cooperation with Russia, China, and the United States in the field of developing 
armed forces capacity. And, Russia and China have expressed their intention to develop 
further cooperation with Turkmenistan. 
D. APPLICATION FOR MONGOLIA 
Based on these studies, we can show that neutral states such as Switzerland, 
Austria, Finland, Sweden, and Turkmenistan have become permanent neutrals due to the 
security conditions in their regions. They also all share concerns about potential threats to 
their sovereignty and independence. Mongolia has not been challenged in its sovereignty 
and territorial integrity. In fact, Mongolia is situated well to isolate itself from potential 
transnational threats, including terrorism, extremism, and religion-based radicals, and 
threats from its two powerful neighboring countries. Yet, it is still vulnerable and lacks 
military capability to engage against transnational threats alone. In this regards, a 
military-to-military relationship with other military forces including those of neighboring 
countries is vital for enhancing capability. 
Swiss neutrality has been a model for most of the small states that have 
implemented permanent neutrality, and neutrality has become part of the Switzerland’s 
national identity. As John Dreyer and Neal G. Jesse assess, Swiss neutrality has been 
successful due to the following three unique features: sustaining an armed defense; 
providing “wide collective goods” such as banking and good offices; and obtaining its 
neutrality as an international norm.144 Switzerland has maintained armed neutrality since 
its independence.  
Nonetheless, these factors that contributed to Switzerland’s successful neutrality 
cannot be factors for Mongolia as a neutral country. Switzerland’s geographic location 
and demographic situation as key features of defense and security are completely 
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different from Mongolia. Switzerland is located in a favorable defensive area of Europe, 
where the Alpine mountains provide great protection. In terms of demographics, 
Switzerland consists of different nationalities, so neutrality has been a tool for solidarity 
or unity within the state. In contrast, Mongolia is located between two powerful 
countries, and its territory is more than 37 times bigger than Switzerland, making it 
difficult to defend. Furthermore, Mongolia does not possess any geographical features 
that could pose as obstacles to potential aggressors, making neutrality a less attractive 
policy for defense, nor is it needed as a tool to promote national unity. The population of 
Mongolia is comparatively homogeneous. Thus, the Mongolian military’s primary 
missions are territorial defense and support of the border protection agencies in case of 
emergency situation. 
Furthermore, Switzerland and other European neutrals have had a history of 
sustaining powerful military forces dominantly consisting of conscripts since the Cold 
War. However, early in this century, European neutrals began decreasing the size of their 
armed forces and even abolishing conscription. In addition, European neutral states have 
strong potential to produce their own military weaponry and equipment in their own 
military industries. Although Mongolia maintains standing professional military forces as 
well as conscripts, it has not developed a military industry yet. The Mongolian Armed 
Forces purchases and gets donated support for most of its military equipment including 
weaponry through close cooperation with other military forces such as those of its two 
neighboring countries. Furthermore, due to their democratic political systems, European 
neutrals share the same military doctrine and culture as most Western military, so they 
face few challenges when they deploy in the peacekeeping operations. Due to its 
completely different military doctrine and culture, Mongolian military personnel have 
met challenges, including language barriers, in interoperability while deploying in 
various peace support operations. In this regard, training with other military forces is vital 
for the Mongolian Armed Forces. 
As noted previously, Switzerland contributes military personnel to UN-mandated 
peace support operations; however, due to the neutrality policy and military law of 
Switzerland, only a limited number of personnel has participated in certain activities as 
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part of peacekeeping operations. Austria and Finland also actively participated in UN, 
EU, and NATO-led peace support operations. In terms of Finnish participation in peace 
operations, Finland prefers to participate more in EU and NATO-led operations rather 
than in UN operations. By contrast, Mongolia contributes infantry battalion together with 
individual military personnel as military observers and liaison officers, as well as police 
advisors, in UN peacekeeping operations. In addition, Mongolia contributes its military 
forces to NATO-led peace support operations and developing cooperation with Western 
military forces including the United States and in military alliance with NATO. Russia 
and China have not expressed support for Mongolia’s military cooperation with Western 
countries and military ally NATO. If Mongolia pursues a permanent neutrality policy, 
these neighboring countries are likely to pressure Mongolia to stop the cooperation even 
though it is limited only to peacekeeping operations enhancement.  
Like the European neutrals, Turkmenistan cannot be a model for Mongolia. 
Turkmenistan’s potential security problems are challenging, and Turkmenistan has to 
manage internal and external threats alone due to its neutral policy.145 However, 
Turkmenistan seeks to develop military-to-military cooperation with other countries 
regardless of its neutrality. Potentially, some countries, including the United States, 
would view Turkmenistan’s neutrality as an obstacle to developing a military-to-military 
relationship between states. From a defense cooperation perspective, Mongolian defense 
cooperation has been much broader than that of Turkmenistan, and through such 
cooperation, the Mongolian military has already enhanced its own image on the 
international security cooperation stage. 
Indeed, the potential status of permanent neutrality might have benefits for 
Mongolia in terms of the economy and politics of the country; however, it certainly 
promises no benefit for Mongolia’s current foreign defense cooperation. The Mongolian 
Armed Forces are seeking broader cooperation with other countries’ military forces in 
order to enhance its peacekeeping capacity, military interoperability, and conventional 
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military capacity. The next chapter examines Mongolia’s current defense cooperation 
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IV. CURRENT MONGOLIAN FOREIGN DEFENSE 
COOPERATION 
Before analyzing the potential effects of permanent neutrality policy for 
Mongolia, Chapter IV examines Mongolia’s current defense cooperation with other 
countries’ defense sectors, including those of neighboring countries, and how Mongolia’s 
military benefits through such relationship.  
Mongolia’s current foreign policy, well known as the “Third Neighbor Policy,” 
aims to promote mutually beneficial partnerships with the other developing democratic 
countries, while maintaining friendly and strategically important relations with 
neighboring countries.146 This encourages the Mongolian Armed Forces to develop 
friendly cooperation with other countries’ military forces while actively engaging in 
global and regional security activities. In the framework of foreign policy objectives, 
Mongolia diversifies its partnership with other developing countries for gaining their 
interest and support in the international arena.147 The Mongolia Armed Forces (MAF) 
have successfully developed mutual and multilateral cooperation with the defense sectors 
of other countries, which has become one of the essential diplomacy tools of 
Mongolia.148 
The MAF successfully enhances cooperation with neighboring countries’ 
military, while developing defense relationships with other countries’ military forces, 
including those of Germany, Turkey, France, and other European countries; India, the 
Republic of Korea (ROK), Japan, and other Asia countries; and Canada, Australia, the 
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United States, and the Asia-Pacific regional countries. Mongolia’s defense relationships 
with other defense forces are based on developing military-to-military cooperation, 
increasing Mongolia’s military interoperability, and enhancing the MAF capabilities, 
particularly, the peacekeeping capability. The MAF benefits from cooperating with other 
military forces by enhancing its peacekeeping and conventional military capacity through 
various types of military education and training; assistance and support of military 
equipment including the purchase of some necessary supplies, such as strategic airlifts, 
the purchase of military weaponry and equipment, or in the form of donations within the 
framework of the military assistance program; and military transformation and 
enhancement of interoperability.   
A. MONGOLIA’S DEFENSE COOPERATION WITH HER NEIGHBORING 
COUNTRIES 
Defense relationships with neighboring countries are significant to Mongolia’s 
defense cooperation. Mongolia has mutually beneficial partnerships and strategic 
cooperation agreements with the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China. 
Mongolia and Russia signed a Treaty on Friendly Relations and Cooperation between 
Russia and Mongolia in 1993.149 Later, both countries signed a Declaration of Strategic 
Partnership in 2009, which provides a broader relationship between the two countries. In 
addition, Mongolia and China signed a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation in 1994, 
which declares mutual respect for the each other’s independence and territorial 
integrity.150 Also, The Joint Declaration of the Establishment of Comprehensive 
Strategic Partnership between Mongolia and China was adopted in 2014. 
Based on those cooperation agreements, the MAF have developed military-to-
military relationship agreements such as the Military and Technical Cooperation 
Agreement with both neighboring countries. Under the framework of the agreements, the 
MAF have educated military personnel in order to enhance military capabilities and to 
                                                 
149 Tsedendamba Batbayar, “Mongolian-Russian relations in the past decade,” Asian Survey 43, no. 6 
(2003): 958. 
150 Alicia Campi, “Sino-Mongolian Relations from Beijing’s Viewpoint,” China Brief 5, no. 10 
(2005): 7–8. 
 65
advance military equipment with modern technologies in the support of the neighboring 
countries defense. 
The MAF cooperation with the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation and the 
People’s Liberation Army of China are crucial not only to building relationships among 
these three countries, but also it builds confidence for both neighboring countries that 
Mongolia’s defense cooperation with other countries is not threatening to those countries’ 
security. Mongolia is developing military relationships in order to enhance peacekeeping 
capacity and to carry out Mongolia’s diplomatic effort to participate in the global peace 
and stability activities. 
1. The MAF Cooperation with the Armed Forces of 
the Russian Federation 
Although the MAF have adopted some Western military socialization through its 
reformation and as effects of the peacekeeping deployment, Russian military standards 
still have a strong impact on military doctrine, procedures, training, and some customs 
and rules. The MAF maintain a close relationship with the Russian military based on 
mutually beneficial cooperation through military and technical cooperation agreement 
and strategically important, friendly neighbor, and military-to-military relationships.  
Compared to military cooperation with other countries, the MAF have the longest 
relationship with the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation, especially throughout the 
twentieth century. Due to the great security challenge, lack of resources, and lack of other 
external support, the Mongolian military adopted the Soviet Union’s military customs, 
training, military doctrine, and procedures in the twentieth century after its independence 
in 1921. Mongolia even allowed Soviet military presence on her soil three times in the 
twentieth century, due to her security vulnerability and security challenges from Japan 
and China.151 After World War II, Mongolia’s military relationship with the Soviet 
Union grew much stronger. The Mongolian military fully transformed the cavalry forces 
to mechanized military. Furthermore, during the Sino-Soviet crisis in the 1960s, the 
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Mongolian military was resupplied with modern military equipment with the assistance 
of the Soviet Union. During the Soviet military presence from 1967 to 1992, Mongolia 
developed its military institution with more heavy influences of Soviet military customs, 
doctrine, and some regulations. Moreover, military interoperability, training, and 
equipment had drastically improved due to active interactions with the Soviet Union and 
other communist countries.152 After the Cold War and the disintegration of the Soviet 
Union, the cooperation between the two militaries significantly decreased due to the 
political and economic challenges of both countries; however, the relationship developed 
again in early 2000s. 
Currently, the MAF maintains a robust cooperation with the Armed Forces of the 
Russian Federation by strengthening military education, enhancing interoperability 
between the two armed forces, and upgrading military equipment and their maintenance 
within the framework of the military and technical cooperation agreement between the 
two armed forces.  
In the area of military training, Russia has offered broader military training 
opportunities to Mongolian officers and non-commissioned officers in all levels of 
military training, including young cadets, enabling them to study in Russia’s Military 
School named after Field Marshal Alexander V. Suvorov. According to Alicia J. Campi’s 
interview with Mongolia’s Ministry of Defense, approximately 60 percent of Mongolian 
military personnel who studied abroad did so in the Russian Federation.153 
Furthermore, both countries have initiated the organizing of bilateral military 
exercises in order to tighten their military relationship, enhance interoperability, and 
enhance military capacities. The MAF and Russian Armed Forces have organized 
bilateral military exercises annually since 2008. The location of the exercise rotates 
between Mongolia and Russia. Both countries referred to the exercise as DARKHAN 
from 2008 to 2010, and the name changed to SELENGA as of 2010. The main theme of 
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this annual exercise is to enhance military interoperability of both military forces, to 
develop counterterrorism coordination with conventional military operations and tactics, 
and to maintain combat operational readiness of the armed forces.  
Mongolia’s conventional military equipment is mainly from Russia. Christopher 
Pultz affirms, “The MAF has relied heavily on Russian support for the majority of its 
conventional military equipment and training.”154 Since the MAF deployed its personnel 
to the peace support operations, the Mongolian peacekeeping forces have faced 
challenges with its military equipment and material support during the execution of the 
peacekeeping missions. For instance, the UN peacekeeping missions in Africa require 
certain capabilities of transportation, protection of the personnel, and modern military 
surveillance equipment due to the nature of the environment as well as the nature of 
conflict. For mitigating these challenges and upgrading military equipment with modern 
technology, the MAF purchases certain conventional military equipment and weaponry 
from Russia.155 Moreover, Russia has provided military technology, conventional 
military equipment, and maintenance services to the MAF as assistance within the 
framework of the military and technical cooperation agreement.156 
Cooperation with the Armed Forces of Russian Federation plays a significant role 
for the MAF in enhancing its capabilities in personnel training and modernizing military 
equipment. These efforts allow the MAF to actively engage in global peace operations 
with capable military personnel and equipment to meet the modern military operations 
environment. As Campi notes, “Ulaanbaatar’s bilateral military relationship with 
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Moscow remains a priority for Mongolia, which sees Russian support as a key factor in 
training the Mongolian armed forces for modern security realities.”157  
2. The MAF Cooperation with the Chinese People’s Liberation Army 
Apart from economic and political cooperation between these two countries, 
security affairs cooperation between Mongolia and China is one of the oldest in human 
history. According to Mendee, the modern defense cooperation between Mongolian and 
Chinese military has focused on confidence building as the main purpose of the 
interaction.158 In the twentieth century, both militaries developed defense relationships 
between 1946 until 1963, through which high officials paid official visits to each other 
and military cultural exchange (military ensemble and sport) activities were initiated. 
However, due to Soviet and Chinese contradistinction, territorial disputes, and 
confrontation during the Cold War, the Mongolia and Chinese defense relationship was 
quite cold until the late 1980s.159 The defense cooperation between two countries 
normalized in the 1990s and high level military delegations paid official visits and 
established several cooperation agreements to build mutual trust, and to improve the 
military-to-military relationship and to enhance Mongolia’s peacekeeping abilities.  
The Mongolian and Chinese military relationship has developed based on good 
and friendly neighbor policies, developing mutual confidence and benefits through 
cooperation, enhancing security cooperation agreements, military and technical assistance 
programs, and enhancing Mongolia’s peacekeeping capabilities. Both countries have the 
same interest in actively participating in UN peacekeeping operations as their foreign 
policy tools and contributing military and police forces to the UN peacekeeping 
operations. 
Under the framework of the military and technical cooperation agreement, 
Mongolian military personnel have attended training in the Chinese military training 
                                                 
157 Campi, “Mongolia and Russia Show Military Sheen.” 
158 Mendee, “Asymmetrical Military Socialization,” 8.  
159 Ibid., 15. 
 69
institutions, and Chinese officers have attended Mongolian language training in 
Mongolia. Moreover, within the framework of developing the military-to-military 
relationship and enhancing military capabilities and military interoperability, both 
military forces have organized several bilateral exercises annually since 2008.160 Both 
countries conducted a bilateral peacekeeping exercise in China in 2008, a disaster relief 
exercise in Mongolia in 2013, and a counterterrorism exercise in Mongolia in 2015. The 
themes of the exercises are focused on UN peacekeeping operations, counterterrorism, 
and disaster relief operations.  
The MAF have received technical assistance from the People’s Liberation Army 
(PLA) within the framework of the military and technical cooperation agreement between 
the two armed forces. The MAF purchases non-combat military equipment and materials, 
military construction engineering and transportation equipment, and other materials. The 
PLA also has provided military engineering and transportation equipment for enhancing 
Mongolia’s peacekeeping capacities, and funding for the MAF’s peacekeepers’ recreation 
center in 2011 as assistance to the MAF.161  
The Mongolian and Chinese military are mainly focused on building trust 
between the two military forces and coordinating to enhance interoperability through 
training, and sharing the experience and supply lines of both armed forces for UN 
peacekeeping, counterterrorism, and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief 
operations.  
B. MONGOLIA’S DEFENSE COOPERATION WITH U.S. MILITARY 
The MAF opened new pages in its modern history by deploying its military 
personnel to the UN peacekeeping operations in the Democratic Republic of Congo and 
Western Sahara in 2002, after a long preparation and cooperation with the UN. Moreover, 
the Mongolian government decided to support a U.S.-led operation in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, and later a NATO-led operation in Afghanistan and Kosovo. These 
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involvements contribute other significances for Mongolia’s military cooperation in 
building peacekeeping ability and affect the evolution of the MAF doctrine, culture, and 
some of its structure.  
The MAF’s military cooperation with the United States has played a significant 
role in Mongolia’s defense reform on developing professional military training, 
particularly NCO development training, peacekeeping operations training, and English 
language training; enhancing military interoperability through training while developing 
Mongolia’s military peacekeeping capabilities and improving its military-to-military 
relationship with the U.S. military and other countries’ military through close cooperation 
and joint training and deploying peace support operations; and assisting on military 
technological improvement for peacekeeping capability.  
Mongolian military personnel have participated in the various levels of military 
training at the U.S. military institutions, including in English training through the U.S. 
security assistance program International Military Education and Training (IMET). Also, 
the MAF English language training together with developing English instructors has been 
funded through this program.162 Those trainings have contributed significantly to 
enhancing Mongolia’s peacekeeping capacity in the training of the professional military 
personnel, interoperability of the MAF, and developing Mongolia’s military cooperation 
with other countries. Moreover, the MAF has developed its NCO corps through an NCO 
development program implemented by the great support from the U.S. military. The 
MAF’s NCO corps has become a primary component to carry out professional military 
tasks, particularly in the peacekeeping operations since the MAF do not deploy conscripts 
in the peace support operations. 
In regards to the development of the MAF’s peacekeeping capacity, the U.S. 
government funded the Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) program, which 
promotes various types of peacekeeping operations training opportunities for the UN 
peacekeeping contributing countries. This program has played a magnificent role in 
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enhancing Mongolian peacekeeping capabilities. Mongolia has been a beneficiary of this 
program by funding for Mongolia’s and other countries’ participation in regional 
peacekeeping exercises, and funding for upgrading the training environment of the 
peacekeeping training center. Through the training opportunity offered by the GPOI 
program, Mongolian peacekeeping forces have attended other military exercises which 
have been organized in the Asia-Pacific region annually, and individual officers and 
NCOs have attended the peacekeeping courses funded and co-organized by the GPOI in 
different countries in the region. In addition, Instructors of the Peace Support Operations 
Training Center (PSOTC) of the MAF have experienced teaching in the peacekeeping 
courses in the regional peacekeeping training centers. Moreover, the GPOI program has 
funded the upgrading of the PSOTC facilities and recognized the PSOTC as the regional 
peacekeeping training center in 2016. Now, this training center is fully functional to carry 
out a brigade-size unit’s command and staff exercise, two full-sized battalion’s 
conventional or peacekeeping field exercises, and is capable to accommodate more than 
2,000 personnel in all seasons. 
The United States Pacific Command (USPACOM) also provides various training 
opportunities for the MAF in order to enhance Mongolia’s military interoperability. The 
MAF has co-organized numbers of bilateral and multilateral peacekeeping operations 
exercises with USPACOM in order to promote military-to-military relationships and 
enhance interoperability of the military personnel, while promoting security cooperation 
with other military forces. The MAF and the USPACOM co-organize the multinational 
peacekeeping operations exercise “Khaan Quest” annually, and the exercise has become 
one of the largest regional exercises, with the number of participating countries in the 
exercise increasing dramatically. Countries from Asia, Australia, Europe, Africa, and 
South America have participated in the “Khaan Quest 2016” multinational peace support 
operations exercise co-organized by the MAF, the GPOI, and the USPACOM in 
Mongolia, which proves that the significance of the exercise has been increasing. In 
addition to “Khaan Quest,” several other exercises, and the UN courses are organized as 
bilateral or multilateral training co-organized with the GPOI or USPACOM. Among 
these are the non-lethal weapons execution exercise, medical capability enhancement 
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training, and engineering capability enhancement training. Those exercises are vitally 
important for enhancing the peacekeeping capacities of the MAF personnel and 
contribute to the success of the MAF accomplishment. Furthermore, with support of the 
U.S. military, the MAF personnel have engaged with regional military forces through 
multilateral military activities such as joint and combined training and security meetings 
in the Asia-Pacific region.163  
This engagement and participation also provides vast opportunities for the MAF 
to interact with regional military forces in order to share experience, to develop active 
cooperation through peacekeeping exercises, and to enhance military cooperation on 
enhancing peacekeeping capability. In addition, Russia has participated in the “Khaan 
Quest” multinational peacekeeping operations exercise since 2006 with observer’s status. 
China also participated in this annual exercise as observers between 2006 and 2014; in 
2015 and 2016, China sent its troops to participate in the “Khaan Quest” operations 
exercise in order to share common peacekeeping knowledge and experience among the 
participating military forces.164  
The United States provides and funds for non-lethal military equipment and 
transportation equipment such as personnel protection equipment, night vision devices, 
and commercial utility vehicles to the MAF for upgrading its equipment to meet the 
requirement of the peacekeeping operations.165 The U.S. military also provides certain 
military equipment support, such as military trucks, for carrying out tasks in the mission 
area; moreover, the United States also provides strategic airlift to the Mongolian 
contingents in Afghanistan.  
In support of USPACOM, the MAF have actively participated in the regional 
peacekeeping operations training and exercises in order to share its peace support 
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operations experience and learning from the other military forces. GPOI and USPACOM 
have organized a regional peacekeeping operations annual exercise in the region. The 
MAF has actively participated in the exercises with its personnel in the staff exercises, 
field training exercises, and instructors at the field training exercise. Those exercises are 
conducted annually in the Asia-Pacific region with the support of USPACOM and GPOI. 
Those annual exercises provide a valuable opportunity for the MAF to learn from the best 
practices as well as to build its confidence and capacity to carry out the peace support 
operations. The PSOTC of the MAF is a member of the Association of Asia-Pacific 
Peace Operations Training Centers (AAPTC) and actively engages in the activities 
including exchange of instructors among the training centers of the association. MAF 
personnel have attended training and courses organized by association member centers. 
Moreover, the MAF has actively participated in the seminars and regional forums in 
regards to regional security concerns.   
Due to its close cooperation with the U.S. military, the MAF has mitigated certain 
challenges such as reforming military training and structure, and adopting some Western 
training standards to its military training. In this regard, Mongolia’s military performance 
in the peace support operations has been significantly increased. As Mendee asserts, “for 
Mongolia, their defense cooperation with the United States brought them one level above 
other developing nations, who are not in closer alliance type relationship with 
Pentagon.”166 Mongolian soldiers proudly carry out their given tasks in the UN 
peacekeeping operations as well as NATO-led peace support operations with high 
performance and accomplishment.  
C. MONGOLIA’S DEFENSE COOPERATION WITH THE OTHER 
DEVELOPED AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
Based on Mongolia’s current foreign policy, Mongolia develops military 
cooperation with other countries besides its immediate neighboring countries’ military 
forces. The MAF have made efforts to develop military-to-military relationships with the 
ROK, Japan, India, and other Asian countries, and other regional countries, such as 
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Canada and Australia. Furthermore, these relationships extend to Germany, Turkey, and 
other European countries, as well as regional organizations of NATO. The MAF taps 
these relationships to enhance its military capacities to participate in the global peace 
support operations, to increase military interoperability, and to increase Mongolia’s 
national security while actively involving it in the international security activities. This 
effort has significantly increased, particularly since Mongolian military personnel have 
deployed in the UN peacekeeping operations since 2002, and other international security 
operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Kosovo since 2003.  
1. Countries in the Vicinity, Including Asia Pacific Regional Countries 
Mongolia’s military foreign cooperation is greatly extended not only through 
cooperation with neighboring countries, but also with Asia-Pacific region and Asian 
countries’ military forces. The MAF cooperation with military forces of India, the ROK, 
Japan, and other Asian countries, and further, with Canada, Australia, and other countries 
in the Asia-Pacific region enhances the MAF’s peacekeeping operations capacities 
through partnership. These partnerships enable the MAF to exchange peacekeeping 
operations best practices while enhancing military interoperability and promoting peace 
and stability through active participation in regional security activities.  
The MAF maintains a military-to-military relationship with ROK Armed Forces 
and Japanese Self-Defense Forces in the development of peace support operations, 
military interoperability, and enhancing military capacity. Mongolian military personnel, 
including military cadets, have attended military training in ROK and Japanese military 
training institutions as well as at institutions for security studies. Both countries have 
contributed their military personnel to UN peacekeeping operations and developing the 
peace support operations capability. The ROK and Japanese military personnel have 
participated with MAF personnel in multilateral peacekeeping exercises, seminars, and 
courses actively. The MAF have conducted a bilateral exercise annually with Japanese 
Self Defense Forces to enhance military engineering capacity and interoperability since 
2014 and conducted a bilateral exercise with ROK military forces in 2007 on 
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counterterrorism. Moreover, the ROK provides military equipment, including personnel 
protection and military transportation equipment as assistance.  
The MAF and Indian Armed Forces have developed a bilateral relationship on 
developing military capacities and enhancing interoperability. Mongolian military 
personnel have attended military training in Indian military institutions such as The 
Defense Services Staff College of India and also in various types of peacekeeping 
training and exercises in India such as the UN Military Observers Course, staff officers’ 
course. MAF personnel also have benefited from English training in India, and India has 
also offered Indian military officers to conduct English training in Mongolia in 2011.  
Within the framework of developing military capacity through military-to-
military partnership activities, Canada, Australia, and India have a role in providing 
military education and training assistance. MAF personnel have attended English and 
French language training in Canada, and the Canadian defense force offers peacekeeping 
operations training and other military training through Canada’s Military Training 
Assistance Program (MPAT). The MPAT has played a significant role in promoting 
Canada’s foreign policy interests, and it has widened its activities to include non-NATO 
members. It offers language training and peacekeeping operations training.167 It has been 
a great opportunity for the MAF to develop personnel education on peacekeeping 
operations and learning from the vast peacekeeping experience of Canadian military. As 
Mendee asserts, “The MTAP provides excellent opportunities to increase Mongolia’s 
capability of peace support operation, and, at the same time, advances mutual 
understanding and friendship between militaries of two nations for future common goals 
of international security.”168 Canadian military personnel have actively participated in the 
annual “Khaan Quest” exercise since its beginning in 2006; moreover, instructors from 
the PSOTC of the MAF have worked as guest instructors at Canada’s Peace Support 
Training Center in Kingston in 2010–2014.  
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In addition to already having an economic, educational, and political relationship 
with Australia, Mongolia currently develops military cooperation with the Australian 
Defense Forces. MAF personnel recently joined to study in Australian defense 
institutions and Australian Defense Forces personnel have participated in the “Khaan 
Quest” exercise frequently since 2006. The Peace Operations Training Center of the 
Australian Defense Forces has invited the instructors to serve as guest instructors for their 
training in 2014. Moreover, there are a number of areas for Mongolia to develop bilateral 
cooperation with Australian Defense Forces, including peace support operations training 
and English training. 
The MAF have developed a wide range of foreign cooperation in Asia-Pacific 
regions in order to enhance its peacekeeping capabilities, sharing its experience while 
learning best practices, and has actively participated in regional security activates. 
2. The MAF Cooperation with European Countries Military and NATO 
In addition to bilateral defense cooperation with China, Russia, and the United 
States, the Mongolian Armed Forces has developed military-to-military relationships 
through bilateral military cooperation agreements with European countries, such as 
Germany, Turkey, Belgium, the UK, France, Luxembourg, Poland, and Italy. 
Cooperation with the European military forces focuses more on Mongolia’s military 
interoperability and capability building through closer partnership. 
Mongolian military interaction with Germany and Turkey are in a broader range 
of cooperation among other European countries. Mongolian military personnel attend all 
levels of the military training in German and Turkish military training and security 
training institutions. The MAF is one of the beneficiaries of the military cooperation 
agreements with those countries in personnel and armed forces capacity development.  
The MAF military contingents have deployed together with German military 
forces in the NATO-led operation in Afghanistan since 2008. The joint pre-deployment 
training was conducted to train the contingents since this unit uses Germany’s military 
equipment and weaponry in the mission area.  
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The German military personnel have actively participated in the “Khaan Quest” 
multinational peacekeeping operations annual exercise as staff officers in the staff 
exercise. In addition, instructors from the UN Training Center of the German Armed 
Forces worked as instructors at the field training exercise the since 2008. Moreover, 
instructor exchange activities between the UN Training Center of the German Armed 
Forces and the PSOTC of the MAF have been conducted several times in order to share 
experience and enhance training capabilities.  
The Turkish and Mongolian military bilateral exercise has been conducted 
annually since 2003 in order to enhance military cooperation between the two armed 
forces and boost counterterrorism capacity and interoperability. 
Both Germany and Turkey have contributed military equipment, such as night 
vision devices, personnel protection and other military supplies for overseas deploying 
units, to the MAF within the framework of military and technical support agreements. 
The German Armed Forces has also provided ten military jeeps to the MAF and some 
other military trucks and equipment as assistance to the PSOTC. 
The MAF has military cooperation with the Belgian armed defense forces for 
enhancing peace support operations capability. The MAF deployed small size military 
units with Belgium’s forces in Kosovo and Afghanistan within the framework of 
cooperation with Belgium Armed Forces. Before deploying to the mission in Kosovo, the 
Mongolian unit conducted pre-deployment training with Belgium’s forces in 2005 and 
2007, in order to train the troops in NATO standard training, equipment familiarization, 
and training on specific tactics and procedures of the Belgian forces. This pre-
deployment training and cooperation in the mission contributed tremendous lessons on 
interoperability and enhancement of the MAF peace support operations capacities, as 
well as experience for future deployments.  
The MAF has valuable support from other European military forces in 
cooperation with them. For instance, the UK has implemented the “Peacekeeping English 
Project” in the MAF in order to support English training for Mongolia’s military 
personnel, particularly military English training for peacekeeping operations. Within the 
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framework of the project, the MAF peacekeeping battalions and the PSOTC have 
established general and military English training sections to conduct English training, and 
it has impacted enormously the effectiveness of the MAF peacekeepers in the mission.169  
In order to train military personnel, the MAF have engaged in cooperation with 
military forces of Luxembourg, Italy, Poland, and France. The MAF personnel have 
attended military training and education programs in France, including French language 
training. Due to deployment in some African countries, the MAF has widened the 
cooperation for French language training and education with France. The Armed Forces 
of France also offered military training and education to MAF personnel at different 
levels of military training in France, which includes French language training. 
In addition, Poland and Italy have offered military education and training for the 
MAF, while other countries such as Luxembourg have trained several officers and NCOs 
in English training.  
Mongolia’s European partners have actively supported Mongolia’s effort to 
enhance military-to-military relationships and promote global peace and security while 
developing its own military capacity. France, the UK, Germany, and Poland have 
participated in the “Khaan Quest” exercise frequently, have offered their trainings to the 
MAF, and have supported Mongolia’s steps to enhance interoperability with NATO. In 
addition, with the support of the UK military, Mongolia successfully co-organized a 
multilateral peacekeeping operations field training exercise with the military forces of 
four permanent members of the United Nations Security Council in 2004.170  
Mongolia has developed relationships with European democratic countries as part 
of its proactive diplomacy since Mongolia peacefully changed its political regime in 
1990. In accordance with Mongolia’s foreign policy, Mongolia develops close 
relationships with other democratic countries, including European countries, to 
counterbalance its two neighboring powerful countries. It accomplishes this while 
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managing non-alignment and not locating any military presence on its territory as 
described clearly in its security, foreign, and defense policies. 
NATO announced its decision to cooperate with Mongolia within the framework 
of the Individual Partnership and Cooperation Program (IPCP) in March 2012.171 
Mongolia has had a long-standing initiative to closely cooperate with NATO since the 
1990s. As part of diversifying its foreign relations, Mongolia expressed its interest to be 
part of the Partnership for Peace program together with the newly independent countries 
in Central Asia and Eastern Europe in 1996.172 It would have provided greater 
opportunity to the MAF to develop its peacekeeping capability earlier; however, some 
members of NATO refused to include Mongolia in this program and create closer 
relationship due to geopolitical concerns of NATO.173 Mongolia worked closely with 
NATO members in order to validate its cooperation with NATO members as a 
beneficiary, as well as a supporter, of NATO’s peacekeeping activities and as a troop-
contributing country to its operation in Afghanistan.174 
Mongolia and NATO have developed cooperation for enhancing Mongolia’s 
military interoperability with NATO forces by Mongolia’s participation in peace 
operations training, courses, and programs to enhance military capacity building through 
military education such as the Defense Education Enhancement Program. Furthermore, 
the PSOTC MAF joined NATO’s network of Partnership Training and Education Center 
as a 29th member in 2014 in order to be part of peace support operations training, and it 
will offer its trainings to NATO members and partners to share its experience and train 
others in the peacekeeping operations according to the NATO training standard.  
The relationship between NATO and Mongolia will extend not only to the 
military but also to the civilian field, particularly in the areas of cyber security, upgrading 
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information technology systems, counterterrorism, and rehabilitation of former military 
sites through NATO’s Science for Peace and Security.175  
Nonetheless, both of Mongolia’s powerful neighbors are unaffected by this 
relationship and have expressed no position on this cooperation; NATO and Mongolia 
only focused on enhancing peacekeeping capacity and capacity building. According to 
Robert Helbig, NATO’s cooperation with Mongolia will develop in certain limited areas; 
it does not affect Mongolia’s bilateral relations with both neighboring countries. 
However, the partnership will continue based on the interests of both sides, and it will be 
genuinely public to avoid arousing the suspicion of Russia, China, and Mongolia’s 
public.176 The future of this cooperation and Mongolia’s desire to import NATO’s 
training standard to train professional military forces to enhance its conventional military 
capacities and peacekeeping capacities are not clear, if Mongolia becomes a permanently 
neutral country. There are questions to answer, such as whether NATO will have interest 
in continuing the cooperation, and how might neighbor countries view Mongolia’s 
behavior and cooperation with the military alliance as a permanently neutral country.  
The MAF have successfully diversified foreign cooperation, which has become a 
diplomacy tool of Mongolia’s foreign policy by creating close cooperation with European 
military forces. Through this cooperation, the MAF is not only a beneficiary but also a 
contributor to global peace and stability. Furthermore, the MAF have been able to 
transform the military, while cooperating with Western countries by upgrading some non-
combat equipment, extending its peacekeeping training with European participation, and 
contributing troops to peace and stability operations through close cooperation with 
NATO members, and most importantly, by importing valuable education and training to 
its personnel through this cooperation. 
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D. BENEFITS OF THE DEFENSE COOPERATION 
With successful development of defense cooperation and partnership, the MAF 
have achieved certain benefits: the MAF have conducted military reform; enhancing their 
peacekeeping and conventional military capacities and interoperability; and successfully 
completed participation in a UN peacekeeping operation and NATO-led and U.S.-led 
peace operations.  
The MAF have undergone successful processes for military transformation and 
building capable forces to conduct peace support operations through cooperation with 
other military forces, including those of neighboring countries. For instance, the MAF 
have modified the former Soviet-style military organizational structures within it to 
achieve a contemporary common military structure. This is based on the former military 
structure with adjustments for Western-style military staff structure. Furthermore, the 
MAF organized a peace support operations standing brigade within the framework of 
enhancing peace support operations capacities. These activities have succeeded after 
successful implementation of the mid-term development plans and close cooperation with 
other countries.177 This brigade is fully responsible for developing peace support 
operations plans, training the battalions for peace operations as UN peacekeeping stand-
by forces, as well as training to enhance MAF conventional military readiness.  
Military personnel who have trained in other countries’ military institutions have 
a significant role for this restructuring and the reform activities of the MAF; moreover, 
foreign military purchase, funding, and assistance in accordance with the military and 
technical agreements between the MAF and other armed forces have vital importance for 
the improvement of the military’s combat and non-combat equipment. Scott Jasper 
defined the transformation as, “a process that shapes the nature of military competition 
and cooperation through new combinations of emerging technologies, streamlined 
organizational structures, innovative process, and adaptive personnel developments.”178 
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In this regard, due to financial and technological vulnerabilities, the MAF transformation 
has been conducted through the direct and indirect support of defense cooperation.  
The MAF has developed a relationship with other military forces and benefited 
from such successful cooperation to enhance its interoperability through close 
partnership. The MAF has organized annual bilateral exercises with Russia, China, India, 
and joint pre-deployment training semi-annually with Germany. Moreover, the MAF co-
organizes a multinational peacekeeping exercise with USPACOM and several other 
bilateral exercises with the U.S. military. The MAF closely coordinates with NATO only 
for training of military personnel, and the PSOTC of the MAF became a member of 
NATO’s network PTEC (Partnership Training and Education Centers) in 2014. Through 
this network, the MAF personnel are able to attend peacekeeping training throughout 
NATO’s partnership training centers, and other members of the network also are able to 
join the training that PSOTC of the MAF organizes. The PSOTC also is a member of the 
AAPTC and actively engages in their activities, including instructor exchanges among 
the training centers of the association. The MAF peacekeeping training capacities have 
been enhanced dramatically through this cooperation.  
The Mongolian Armed Forces personnel have also successfully participated in the 
various peace support operations. That includes NATO-led and U.S.-led coalition 
operations in Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan, and the UN peacekeeping operations earlier 
in Sierra Leone, Chad, and Georgia, Ethiopia and Eritrea, and currently in Darfur and 
Abyei regions of Sudan, South Sudan, Western Sahara, and Democratic Republic of 
Congo. One of the outcomes of successful participation has been the technical support, 
which includes using modern military equipment, and the training support provided by 
the cooperating countries. 
E. CONCLUSION  
Mongolian defense diplomacy has developed based on enhancing Mongolia’s 
defense capabilities and interoperability through military-to-military partnership; 
reforming military forces by diversifying military cooperation; and contributing its forces 
to global security and stability activities as a diplomatic tool while strengthening 
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Mongolia’s international status. As Dorjjugder Munkh-Ochir acknowledges, “Mongolia’s 
peacekeeping commitments evolved from [Mongolia’s] multi-pillar foreign policy.”179 
The Mongolian military has benefited from the close cooperation with neighboring 
countries while developing close defense cooperation and gaining their interest to 
cooperate with Mongolia’s military. 
The MAF has significantly benefited through those diverse partnerships that 
enable its military personnel to be educated in different countries’ training institutes. 
Those personnel who earned the different types of military education have become the 
core of the MAF reforms that have developed highly capable professional forces.  
During the last two decades, the MAF has successfully integrated with other 
armed forces including those of its two neighboring countries in order to enhance its 
peacekeeping capacity as well as to transform the armed forces. Mongolia’s permanent 
status of neutrality might impose constraints and limitations for Mongolia’s continued 
successful cooperation. In addition, the status of permanent neutrality could lead to the 
potential seclusion of Mongolia from future international defense cooperation.  
 
  
                                                 
179 Dorjjugder Munkh-Ochir, “Same Rules, New Dimensions for Mongolia’s National Security: 
Adapting to the New Geo-Economic Environment,” Brookings Northeast Asia Commentary, no. 32, 
(October 2009). 
 84




The Mongolians have debated Mongolia’s potential declaration of permanent 
neutrality status since September 2015, but the final decision had not been made as of 
September 2016. In these debates, there has been no input on what the potential effects of 
permanent neutrality status might be on Mongolia’s current foreign defense cooperation. 
This thesis analyzed the potential effects of permanent neutrality on Mongolia’s 
current defense foreign cooperation based on a study of the concept of neutrality; an 
examination of the defense cooperation experience of neutral countries such as 
Switzerland, Finland, Sweden, Austria, and Turkmenistan; and evaluation of Mongolia’s 
current defense cooperation. Mongolia’s current defense cooperation, particularly its 
active engagement in global peace and security operations, and enhancement of 
Mongolia’s military capacity and interoperability through military training with other 
armed forces, will face challenges due to the proposed neutrality policy. Moreover, 
Mongolia has implemented military transformation through close relationship with other 
military forces; neutrality might impact the reformation of the MAF. 
A. POTENTIAL EFFECTS OF PERMANENT NEUTRALITY STATUS ON 
MONGOLIA’S FOREIGN DEFENSE COOPERATION 
Permanent neutrality might have positive effects on Mongolia’s politics, 
economy, and other branches of the state institutions. This thesis analyzes potential 
effects of permanent neutrality status only as regards Mongolia’s current foreign defense 
cooperation, as a subject that needs more consideration.  
Permanent neutrality status would challenge Mongolia’s defense cooperation with 
other military forces by discouraging other countries’ interest in partnering with 
Mongolia. Mongolia might also receive potential direct or indirect pressure from 
powerful neighbors to eliminate defense cooperation, leading to lost opportunities for 
developing military capacity through cooperation.  
According to Mongolia’s current foreign policy, Mongolia seeks mutually 
beneficial, strategically important cooperation with its powerful neighboring countries. 
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Moreover, Mongolia develops cooperation with other countries in order to balance 
against the two powerful neighbors’ potential dominance in economic and political 
spheres. Within the framework of foreign policy, Mongolia’s defense cooperation has 
increased successfully since the 1990s and become a foreign policy diplomatic tool to 
gain other countries’ interest and to enhance Mongolia’s peacekeeping capacity. The 
MAF has dramatically increased its cooperation with neighboring countries while 
enhancing its cooperation with the armed forces of other countries in Europe, Asia, and 
the Asia-Pacific region. Through the MAF’s improved peacekeeping capacity, the MAF 
has benefited by enhancing its military training, reforming the military forces, and 
expanding its military capacity while developing military technology through military-to-
military relationships. 
Consequently, some countries are interested in cooperating with Mongolia at least 
in the defense sector. European neutral countries have their own potential to defend their 
sovereignty and neutrality though their well-developed and well equipped military forces 
should their sovereignty be threatened or violated. They all have transformed their 
military forces and reformed their military forces based on professionally oriented forces 
while maintaining conscription. Furthermore, they all have developed military industries, 
and they manufacture a certain amount of weaponry and military equipment in these 
domestic military industries. All European neutrals are democracies and closely 
coordinate with the European Union and in military alliance with NATO without 
membership.  
In contrast, Mongolia has not developed any military industries and has no 
potential to produce its own military technologies. Mongolia has mitigated the challenge 
through cooperation, purchase, and support through military technical agreements with 
other countries, including its neighboring countries. 
Mongolia's contribution to the UN peacekeeping operation has also mitigated 
challenges of military technology and proper equipment. The MAF is dependent on 
foreign assistance and support for its military equipment and is managing these 
challenges through close cooperation with neighboring countries and other developed 
militaries. A policy of neutrality would create unfavorable conditions for enhancing 
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necessary military equipment and technology. One clear example is provided by 
Turkmenistan’s military forces, which faced a similar issue on developing military 
technology. Turkmenistan’s security situation requires that development, so the country 
is seeking assistance and cooperation from developed countries such as Russia and the 
United States. 
Furthermore, in the case that Mongolia pursues permanent neutrality, the MAF 
could experience pressure from neighboring countries related to that status. China and 
Russia do not have any effect on Mongolia’s decision to become a permanently neutral 
country; however, they might require Mongolia to eliminate some of the military 
cooperation based on its neutrality status and legal limits on defense cooperation and 
military alliances. Even though Russia, China, and NATO are not particularly belligerent, 
Russia and China are always careful about NATO and Western countries’ military 
cooperation in the region. For instance, Mongolia has to terminate its cooperation with 
NATO, particularly Mongolia’s contribution in the NATO-led military operation. 
Contemporary relationships between NATO and Russia are quite cold due to Russia’s 
behavior toward Ukraine and on the controversy over NATO’s missile defense system in 
Eastern European countries.  
Currently, Mongolia and some of its cooperating countries’ militaries have gone 
through challenges due to the hesitation of China and Russia to support Mongolia’s 
defense cooperation. For instance, Russia has delayed air clearance for NATO’s airlift for 
transporting Mongolia’s military loads to Iraq and Afghanistan, and Turkish military 
aircraft to participate in a military exercise in Mongolia.180 The U.S. military has 
experienced long procedures for Chinese air clearance as well as delays for “Khaan 
Quest” multinational exercises. Furthermore, Mongolia cancelled France-supported 
peacekeeping participation in Lebanon in 2008 due to Russia’s refusal to support the 
activity. 
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If Mongolia adopts permanent neutrality, Russia would not need to doubt 
Mongolia’s behavior in military cooperation with China or other countries.181 
Nonetheless, Russia could request Mongolia to eliminate the cooperation with NATO, 
although the cooperation is only for peacekeeping purposes. Helbig states that currently 
the Kremlin does not oppose Mongolia’s cooperation with NATO as long as it would not 
affect the Mongolian and Russian relationship.182 This cooperation and participation in 
the NATO-led peace support operation in Afghanistan is a fragile cooperation for 
Mongolia.  
Similarly, Mongolia’s southern neighbor does not currently have any influence on 
Mongolia’s cooperation with Russia, European countries, Asian countries, and 
particularly NATO; however, it might become concerned about Mongolia’s defense 
cooperation with the United States. As Helbig states, “Beijing is especially concerned 
over U.S. engagement in Mongolia for geopolitical reasons, fearing that Mongolia is a 
pawn on the U.S. chessboard in the Pacific region.”183 China might enact measures to 
limit Mongolia’s defense cooperation with the U.S. military, NATO, and other regional 
military forces. 
European neutral countries are all democracies and have already built stronger 
relationships with other democracies. They also benefit from the potential support of 
NATO such that they have felt no pressure on them due to their neutrality. However, in 
the Mongolian case, there is no existing source of potential support to encourage defense 
cooperation and no guarantee against external pressures on the MAF to eliminate the 
defense cooperation. 
The MAF have contributed combat units in the form of a mechanized infantry 
company or battalion to the UN peacekeeping operations. These contributions signify that 
Mongolia actively engages global peace and stability as a member of the international 
community. In addition, the MAF have benefited by enhancing combat and peacekeeping 
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capability through cooperation with other countries’ military forces through joint training 
exercises such as multilateral and bilateral training exercises, the training of officers and 
NCOs for UN peacekeeping operations, and by participating in the coalition peace 
support operations as well as UN peacekeeping operations. 
In contrast, European neutral countries, particularly the Swiss military, 
contributes only military experts and non-combat units to UN peacekeeping operations. 
Austria, Sweden, and Finland’s contribution to the UN peacekeeping operation is the 
modest; however, they actively contribute combat units and sustain stand-by military 
units for UN peacekeeping without active participation. Those countries contribute a 
certain amount of enablers and combat units with limited capacity to the NATO-led 
operations in Afghanistan. Furthermore, Finland’s and Sweden’s closer cooperation with 
NATO has created a huge debate about their neutrality at home and in countries in their 
region. In particular, Russia strongly condemns and even threatens them for potentially 
seeking membership in NATO.184 In this regard, if Mongolia decides to pursue 
permanent neutrality, Mongolia would receive certain pressure from its neighboring 
countries in connection with military cooperation, which may result in discouraging the 
interest of current military partnership countries. 
Those cooperation challenges could lead to the irrelevance of the Mongolian 
military internationally, and further, it would cause a lack of capacity in peacekeeping 
operations, particularly combat capability to participate in the peace support operations 
and to defend the sovereignty of the country. 
The MAF has benefited from the military cooperation with U.S. military forces 
and other military in the Asia-Pacific region through USPACOM, which enhances the 
MAF’s peacekeeping interoperability and contributes its experience to share with other 
UN peacekeeping contributing countries in the region, including Chinese military. In 
addition, training and educating the military personnel within the framework of the 
defense cooperation is another essential tool for enhancing military capacity and 
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reforming Mongolia’s military forces for developing capacity. One question without 
answer at this moment is whether the U.S. and other countries’ military have an interest 
in cooperating with a permanently neutral country. Would they be interested in 
cooperating with Mongolia’s military forces even it is only for capacity development and 
interoperability enhancement? 
In addition, neutrality could create challenges for military forces related to 
contemporary collective security. Due to the political and economic globalization and the 
development of sophisticated technology, the conflict environment has changed 
dramatically, and threats have become transnational. All countries, whether they are big 
or small, are challenged with transnational threats. To maintain peace and security in the 
region as well as globally, countries are placing greater emphasis on collective security. 
There would be issues for neutral countries cooperating with military alliances in order to 
enhance military capacity and coordinate with other militaries when facing transnational 
threats, such as terrorism. Neutrals could be forced to face the challenges alone.  
Mongolia’s geographic location provides an advantage of isolating it from some 
of the transnational threats such as extremism and insurgents. As Otgonbayar Mashbat 
states, “Mongolia is isolated and protected from many kinds of regional security 
challenges. No military threat will come to our land from a third nation over Russia and 
China.”185 However, Mongolia is vulnerable to most contemporary transnational threats, 
such as terrorism, drug and human trafficking, and cyberattacks. Mongolia can only deal 
with contemporary international threats through close cooperation with neighboring 
countries and other countries’ security agencies and forces. Neutrality status or policy 
would isolate Mongolia from defense cooperation with other countries’ military forces as 
well as from partnering with other international security organizations in order to enhance 
capacity and mitigate potential challenges through cooperation. 
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In the president’s proposal and the draft neutrality law, the text expresses that 
permanent neutrality would not affect Mongolia’s current bilateral and multi-lateral 
cooperation agreements. However, when any of the cooperation agreements expire or 
need improvement in certain areas, there would be an issue surrounding the interest of the 
partner country or organization in continuing the agreements, particularly on defense 
cooperation. Neutrality could lead to pressure from Mongolia’s neighboring countries 
and might discourage partners from resuming the cooperation. 
Mongolia’s foreign defense cooperation and active participation in the peace 
support operations provide positive impacts on the development of peacekeeping and 
combat military capabilities and building a fundamental international profile in 
international cooperation. Permanent neutrality would cause Mongolia’s defense to step 
backward at least two decades, and long developed cooperation with other partners, 
including Mongolia’s neighboring countries’ defense, would become useless. 
B. RECOMMENDATION  
Mongolia’s current non-aligned, nuclear free, and ad-hoc neutrality based on its 
constitution and other constitutional strategic documents is the good enough for 
Mongolia. It does not need to pursue permanent neutrality from a foreign defense 
cooperation perspective. Neutrality policy can provide potential protection for the small 
and weak states’ sovereignty and territorial integrity, for instance Switzerland and 
Austria; however, it can also lead to certain irrelevance and isolation from the integration 
and interdependence of the contemporary globalized world, as it has in the case of 
Turkmenistan.  
With regard to Mongolia’s active participation in global peace and security 
activities as a foreign policy tool and Mongolia’s active development of foreign defense 
cooperation, permanent neutrality status is not a policy to support further development of 
the military-to-military cooperation to other countries. Mongolia stands to lose these 
opportunities for continued cooperation, which have proven extremely beneficial, and 
will leave Mongolia with limited military capacity to participate in the global peace and 
security operations, or even to defend its own sovereignty.  
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The twenty-first century’s security environment has dramatically changed. 
Transnational security challenges every state, including developed countries; a state 
cannot deal with such threats alone. Even the strong and powerful countries such as the 
United States, Russia, and China have sought potential partnerships to strengthen their 
own security as well as that of their partners through closer security cooperation. 
Mongolia is a small, weak state in terms of its demography, economy, and geopolitical 
influence in East Asia. This country is greatly challenged by potential transnational 
threats, and has tried to gain the interest of other powerful countries together with its 
neighboring countries to build economic and political capacity. The defense sector’s 
foreign cooperation has played a significant role for Mongolia’s military reform and for 
enhancing its limited capacity. Mongolia has to continue the process and extend its 
contribution to global peace and security, and it must develop close cooperation with 
other defense forces for enhancing the interoperability.  
Mongolia has built a military image in the world’s peacekeeping environment 
through its contribution and close cooperation with other countries’ military forces 
including the armed forces of its two powerful neighboring countries. Mongolia’s foreign 
defense cooperation has played a key role for building ability and enhancing capacity and 
interoperability of the MAF. 
Indeed, based on the analysis in this study, permanent neutrality policy would not 
be the policy to suggest from the perspective of Mongolia’s foreign military cooperation. 
The policy would discourage partnering countries’ interest in cooperating with Mongolia, 
and Mongolia would be challenged to enhance its military capacity and interoperability 
through training exercises and participation in peace support operations. Since Mongolia 
already faces challenges concerning its capacity to carry out certain tasks, military-to-
military relationships and cooperation are still vital, particularly in this challenging 
contemporary security environment.  
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